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Abstract 
 
 
 
The thesis focuses on three topics of interest: the difference between native and 
immigrant welfare receipts, returns to education due to educational mismatch between 
natives and the foreign-born employees, and the effects of agglomeration on earnings. 
The first chapter of the dissertation examines the difference in social income between 
natives and immigrants across a number of EU countries and the US, based on the 
generosity of the existing welfare systems. The findings confirm the existence of large 
social income gaps in favour of non - EU immigrants, and these gaps are mainly due 
to the fact that immigrants’ families have more children, fewer earners and are more 
likely to have non-wage income than the natives. The second chapter compares the 
difference in returns to education between foreign-born and native workers in France, 
Germany, and Austria. Using an educational matching approach, the results show that 
immigrants have lower wage returns in being over-educated than natives but are 
penalized less for being under-educated. The third chapter focuses on the distribution 
of earnings across the UK from a spatial perspective, which is determined by the 
endogenous relationship between productivity and agglomeration or employment 
density. While the agglomeration effects are similar across different levels of 
territorial aggregation, they prove to be strongest in the Metropolitan areas of the UK. 
 
 
Tato práce se zabývá následujícími třemi tématy: rozdíly mezi sociální podporou pro 
rodilé státní příslušníky a imigranty, výnosy ze vzdělání rodilých státních příslušníků 
a imigrantů a efekty aglomerace na příjmy. První kapitola disertace analyzuje rozdíly 
v sociálních příjmech mezi rodilými státními příslušníky a imigranty ve vybraných 
zemích EU a v USA, s ohledem na velkorysost stávajících sociálních systémů. Závěry 
potvrzují existenci značných rozdílů zvýhodňujících imigranty ze zemí mimo EU. 
Tyto rozdíly je možné vysvětlit zejména tím, že rodiny imigrantů mají více dětí, méně 
vydělávajících rodinných příslušníků a mají častěji vedlejší (nemzdové) příjmy než 
rodilí státní příslušníci. Druhá kapitola analyzuje rozdíly ve výnosech ze vzdělání 
mezi rodilými pracovníky a ostatními pracovníky ve Francii, Německu a Rakousku. 
Závěry založené na přístupu párování úrovně vzdělání ukazují, že imigranti mají nižší 
zvýšení příjmů spojené s překvalifikací a nižší snížení příjmů spojené s nedostatečnou 
kvalifikací. Třetí kapitola se zaměřuje na distribuci příjmů ve Spojeném království 
(UK), determinovanou endogenním vztahem mezi produktivitou a aglomerací nebo 
hustotou zaměstnanosti. Zatímco efekty aglomerace jsou podobné na různých 
úrovních teritoriální aglomerace, nejsilnější efekty lze nalézt v metropolitních 
oblastech UK.  
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Introduction 
 
 
 
 
The first two chapters of my dissertation address issues related to differences 
in earnings between natives and immigrants across a number of European countries 
based on the generosity of welfare systems as a magnet for immigration or the 
existence of an educational mismatch between natives and immigrants. The third 
chapter also focuses on the distribution of earnings but from a spatial perspective, 
based on the endogenous relationship between productivity and agglomeration 
(employment density). The empirical analysis in all chapters is based on data from 
household surveys; the first two chapters use data from the Luxemburg Income Study 
which provides extensive information on all types of social benefits and comparable 
standardized data across countries, while the third chapter is based on data from the 
UK Office for National Statistics. 
 
The first chapter focuses on the concept of ‘welfare migration’ which explains 
migration motivated by welfare receipt. In this paper I use comparable data from five 
countries - Norway, Sweden, Belgium, France and the U.S. - to ask whether 
immigrants benefit more from social support than natives. Looking at the European 
countries, distinguishing between migrants within and from outside the EU shows that 
within - EU migrants are similar to natives both in terms of their characteristics and 
social support receipt. On the other hand, I confirm the existence of large social 
income gaps in favour of the non - EU immigrants, and these gaps are mainly due to 
the fact that immigrants’ families have more children, fewer earners and are more 
likely to have no wage income. Household characteristics play a key role in 
‘explaining’ the gap in Scandinavian countries, while individual characteristics matter 
as well in Belgium and France. In contrast to the European situation, U.S. immigrants 
receive less social income than natives and this is attributable mainly to their different 
individual characteristics 
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The second chapter is on measuring the gap in returns to education between 
foreign-born and native workers in France, Germany, and Austria and investigates the 
extent to which this gap can be explained by a mis-match between the actual and the 
years of schooling typical for a given occupation. The return to usual years of 
schooling across different occupations is found to be higher than that for actual years 
of education. In the case of correctly matched workers who have the ‘typical’ 
education in a certain occupation, there is no additional reward in earnings for natives 
compared to foreign workers. Immigrants, however, have significantly lower wage 
returns in being over-educated than natives but are penalized less for being under-
educated. 
 
The third chapter examines the impact of employment density (agglomeration) 
on the hourly earnings of workers across districts within Great Britain. The potential 
two-way causality between agglomeration and productivity is addressed by using two 
instruments, namely, the total land area of a district and its population density. The 
estimated agglomeration effect is similar across different levels of territorial 
aggregation; however, the effect is stronger when looking only across Metropolitan 
areas. While the paper finds some evidence of endogeneity when the sample is split 
into Metropolitan and Non-Metropolitan areas, this only has a minor effect on the 
estimates. 
 
  
Chapter 1 
 
What Is Behind Native-Immigrant 
 Social Income Gaps?* 
 
 
 
Co-authored with Teodora Paligorova 
 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
European Union enlargement fuels the debate on whether the large inflows of 
immigrants impose a fiscal burden on host counties1. Typically younger than natives, 
immigrants can ameliorate the negative effect of progressive aging in Europe by 
increasing the ratio of workers to retirees (Razin and Sadka, 2004; Facchini, Razin 
and Willmann, 2004). On the other hand, lower skilled migrants may be net 
beneficiaries of Western Europe welfare systems. In Sweden, Germany and Denmark, 
where immigrants account for approximately 10 percent of the total population, they 
receive more than 30 percent of total welfare expenditure (Wildasin, 2004). Sinn 
(2005) argues that migrant workers in Germany are net beneficiaries of the 
redistributive activities of the welfare system. To better understand how welfare 
generosity aﬀects migration choices (“welfare migration”) and its net impact on the 
state, it is important to shed light on the sources of the overall welfare gap between 
immigrants and natives. 
The question of whether immigrants rely on welfare programs more than 
natives has received lots of attention in the literature. Borjas and Hilton (1996) show 
that immigrants draw more heavily on cash benefits than natives in the US. In the 
same spirit, Hansen and Lofstrom (2003) conclude that welfare payments are still 
                                                 
* This paper is co-authored with Teodora Paligorova. The authors are grateful to Štěpán Jurajda and 
Randall Filer for their helpful comments and creative ideas.  
1 Total net annual migration into the EU is close to 1 million persons during 2000-2002. The number of 
legal immigrants into the EU reached a peak of 1.2 million in 1992, mainly due to a large influx of 
refugees from former Yugoslavia. Most of the voluntary migration in recent decades is characterized 
by temporary labour migrants who are generally low-skilled, low-paid and depend extensively on 
welfare benefits (Eurostat, 2000). 
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 higher among immigrants in Sweden even after accounting for observed 
characteristics. Brücker et al. (2002) estimates a probability model of welfare 
dependence for each of the eleven EU countries. After controlling for various 
observable characteristics, they find mixed evidence that immigrants are more likely 
to rely on welfare receipt.  
One aspect of immigrants’ experience that has attracted less attention is how 
diﬀerences in individual and household characteristics explain the social income 
diﬀerential between immigrants and natives. We use data from the Luxembourg 
Income Study (LIS) for 2000 to make a comparative analysis of the determinants of 
social income in four European countries known for their high immigration rates, 
namely France, Belgium, Sweden and Norway.2 We also include the US as a useful 
benchmark given the extensive literature on welfare dependence of immigrants in that 
country. 
First, we estimate a social income function for each country, separately for EU 
and non-EU migrants. We then use the Oaxaca-Blinder method to decompose the 
immigrant-native social income gap into two parts. One related to diﬀerences in 
individual and household characteristics, and the second, a “discrimination” 
component, that is deviations from the evaluation of observables. If there is a favour 
toward immigrants in welfare take-up, the gap between immigrants and natives will 
increase the latter component. 
Our study diﬀers from previous studies in several aspects. First, we use 
Luxembourg Income Study data, which provide extensive information on all types of 
social benefits that is comparable across countries. This allows us to conduct 
comparative analysis of the various factors aﬀecting the social incomes of EU/non-
EU immigrants and natives. This is valuable information given the relevance of 
further harmonization of national social policies across EU members (De Giorgi and 
Pellizzari, 2009). Second, most studies examine welfare rates focusing on only one 
country (e.g., Riphahn (2004), Gustafsson and Osterberg (2001), Sinn (2005)). 
Brücker et al. (2002) is one exception that analyses 11 European countries. Instead of 
estimating the probability of welfare receipt, we examine the social income 
                                                 
2 Although not a member of the EU as of 2000, Norway has access to the EU internal labour market 
through the European Economic Area Agreement (EEA). The Agreement commits Norway to 
implement all EU legislation related to the internal labour market. 
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 diﬀerential, which allows us to determine the relative position of the EU and non-EU 
immigrants with respect to natives in terms of their characteristics. 
Third, this paper also examines diﬀerences between EU and non-EU 
immigrants. It is expected that immigrants from EU countries have similar 
characteristics to natives in the host county and thus receive similar social benefits. In 
addition, welfare regimes in the EU are harmonized to a larger extent than between 
EU and non-EU countries.3 Non-EU immigrants, who immigrate to a certain EU 
country, are subject to the immigration and welfare policies of that particular country. 
We find that, compared to natives, non-EU immigrants are younger, live in larger 
families with fewer earners and have more children, while EU immigrants similar to 
natives. The social income gaps between the non-EU migrants and natives are 
substantially larger than those among natives and within-EU migrants. 
Our decomposition results show that a substantial part of the gap in Sweden, 
Norway, Belgium and France is due to the fact that non-EU immigrants live in 
families with fewer earners, have more children, and are more likely not to have any 
labour income. In addition to household characteristics, individual characteristics of 
immigrants such as age, gender and education play an important role in explaining the 
diﬀerentials in Belgium and France. Consistent with previous evidence, the US 
provides higher social income to natives mainly due to diﬀerences in individual 
characteristics. 
The magnitude of the “unexplained” portion of the social income diﬀerential 
varies across countries. One interpretation is that EU states prefer non-EU immigrants 
compared to natives when distributing social benefits, all other things equal. For 
example Brücker et al. (2002) suggest that the unexplained portion may arise from the 
choice of immigrants to live in a country with generous welfare benefits based on 
some unobserved factor, or it may be that language problems make immigrants more 
reliant on welfare. Whatever the reason for the ‘unexplained” social income 
diﬀerential, it highlights that the heterogeneity of welfare provision across EU 
countries is still present.  
                                                 
3 Since the Maastricht Treaty (1992), the European Union guarantees free movement of people within 
its borders and according to a proposal by the European Commission, all workers with EU citizenship 
are “entitled to the full social security benefits of whatever EU country they are employed in and these 
benefits would be transferred from one member state to another in case the worker moved” (COM, 
2003/596). 
5 
 The benefit of reducing such heterogeneity is highlighted by Giorgi and 
Pellizzari (2009) who find that welfare driven migration may oﬀset the potential 
benefits of migration flows. Assumed to be more mobile than natives, if migrants 
choose locations based only on high wages and high employment probabilities their 
migration decisions will mitigate the eﬀect of labor demand shocks. However, if they 
prefer a country also because of its welfare generosity, decisions may not 
counterbalance labor demand shocks. 
 
1.2 Legal Developments in the EU concerning Mobility and 
Immigration and Literature Review 
 
The Treaty of Amsterdam 1999, which covers wide range of EU issues such as the 
policy on asylum, visa policy, the free movement of persons, rules on crossing EU 
external borders, immigration policy, the rights of nationals of third countries, is a 
symbol of the steps toward common asylum and immigration policy of the European 
Union. Since then, various regulations by the Commission, the Council and the Court 
of Justice have strengthened even further the basis of the Amsterdam treaty 
(EUROSTAT, 2002). The European Employment Strategy focused on facilitating 
labour mobility within the EU and providing access to lifelong earnings.4 The 
Stockholm European Council in 2001 enhanced also mobility by endorsing the 
strategy to foster the development of the New European Labour Markets.5  In the field 
of social security there have been several initiatives in order to improve coordination 
and provide more opportunities for workers and job seekers to make use of their right 
to free movement. The new European Strategy to promote social inclusion emerged 
naturally due to the National Action Plans of several member states which feared the 
higher risk of social exclusion for ethnic minorities and immigrants due to the 
growing ethnic and cultural diversities in the EU.6  
In line with conclusions of the Tampere European Council (October 1999), the 
Commission proposed a co-ordinated approach on how to manage the migration flows 
and fight illegal immigration. This has been followed by various integration and anti-
                                                 
4 Guidelines For Member States Employment Policies for the year 2002 - COM(2001) 511. 
5 New European Labour Market: Open to All with Access to All - COM(2001) 116. 
6 Joint Inclusion Report by the Council and the Commission, adopted by the Council on 3/12/2001. 
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 discrimination policies in the host countries which called for equal treatment 
irrespective of ethnic or race origin.7 Within the European regulations, a key 
distinction is currently being made between individuals who migrate from within the 
EU and third country immigrants. While the EU migrant workers have the same rights 
and obligations as the host country nationals with respect to the social security (Kvist, 
2004), third country migrants are clearly a different category despite all the co-
ordination regulations in immigration and asylum policies (Cohen and Razin, 2008).8 
The question of whether immigrants rely more on welfare than natives has 
received lots of attention in the literature. Enchautegui (1997) finds a positive 
correlation between welfare and migration in the United Sates. This premise is 
supported by a range of studies on U.S. data such as those by Blau (1984), Borjas and 
Trejo (1991), Borjas and Hilton (1996), and Hu (1998). Borjas and Hilton (1996) 
document the extent to which immigrants participate in welfare programs. They 
suggest the existence of a large ‘welfare gap’. U.S. immigrants experience more and 
longer unemployment spells, and there is a positive correlation between the types of 
welfare benefits received by earlier immigrants and those obtained by recently arrived 
immigrants. 
Siklos and Marr (1998) find that immigrants in Canada are more likely to 
receive social benefits, while according to Baker and Benjamin (1995) it is the local 
population who benefits primarily from the social welfare system. Gustman and 
Steinmeir (1998) conclude that immigrants receive much higher social benefits 
relative to US born workers with identical earnings but these transfers do not result 
from low incomes of immigrants. The immigrants with high earnings who have been 
working in the US for up to two decades are found to benefit the most from public 
transfers. Although, foreign born workers have a higher return to their social security 
taxes, US born workers still prefer that immigrants participate in the social security 
program since the retired immigrants contribute more to social security taxes in 
comparison to the amount of the received benefits. 
There is also literature on the incidence of welfare take-ups in the EU. Brücker 
et al. (2002) use the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) for the period 
                                                 
7 Implementation of the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of race or ethnic 
origin. Directive 2000/43/EC. 
8 EU migrants can transfer benefits, eligibility periods at different times can be aggregated, the setting 
of benefits could be accumulated on the basis of time spent in the host country. Council Regulation 
1408/71. 
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 1994-2006 to examine the diﬀerences in the rate of welfare dependency between 
natives and non-EU immigrants. They find that even after controlling for individual 
characteristics the “immigrant eﬀect” still remains. 
Bird et al. (1999) use data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study 
(GSOEP) to test whether immigrants in Germany, given their eligibility, are more 
likely to claim welfare benefits than natives. The authors find positive evidence of 
immigrants receiving more welfare benefits in comparison to natives mainly because 
of two reasons: first, there is a higher probability of immigrants being eligible to 
receive benefits, and second, the immigrants who are eligible are more likely to 
actually claim these benefits. 
 Riphahn (1998) who focuses on the higher welfare dependence of immigrants 
in Germany using the German Socio-Economic Panel, finds that the difference in 
aggregate welfare dependence between natives and foreigners appears to be due to 
their characteristics, where the household head’s labour market status and single 
parent status are central. Castranova et al. (2001) examine whether German 
immigrants are more likely to receive benefits conditional on eligibility. They find that 
they are not more likely to take up welfare than natives conditional on eligibility; 
however, they are more likely to be eligible. Büchel and Frick (2003) compare the 
immigrants’ pre-tax to after tax labour income across eight European Union countries 
using the European Household Panel Survey. They find persistent differences across 
the examined countries in the relative economic performance (gross income) of 
immigrants in comparison to the local population.  The authors explain this 
heterogeneity both by the variation of entry conditions to the EU and country-specific 
institutional aspects. 
There is growing literature on whether diﬀerence in welfare regimes lead to 
diﬀerences in the nature of the immigrant inflow across countries. De Giorgi and 
Pellizzari (2009) discuss the role of generous welfare transfers in attracting migrants 
and explore the issue of welfare migration across the countries of the pre-enlargement 
European Union. Their empirical analysis is based on data from the European 
Community Household panel (ECHP) and the OECD data-base on benefit 
entitlements and replacement rates, which shows that migrants decide which country 
to migrate to based, among other factors, on the generosity of the welfare systems 
across host-countries. Despite the significant but small effect of the generosity of 
8 
 welfare on migration decisions, this effect is still large enough to distort the 
distribution of migration flows.  
Cohen and Razin (2008) analyze the effect of the generosity of the welfare 
state on the skill composition of immigrants. The authors develop a model in which 
higher generosity (and taxes) of the welfare state worsens the skill composition of 
immigrants under free migration. In particular it attracts more unskilled migrants who 
tend to benefit more from the welfare system than spend on taxes and deters skilled 
immigrants who contribute in taxes more than in benefits. However, once the 
migration is controlled by a policy, there is a positive impact of generous welfare 
systems on the skills composition of migrants. Thus, skilled migrants who are net 
contributors to the welfare state, can help finance a more generous welfare-state 
system and are preferred by the policy maker over unskilled migrants. The authors 
test their hypothesis on a cross-sectional data on source-host, OECD-EU country pairs 
for the year 2000. They split the sample into two groups: a "free migration" group, 
source-host country pairs within the EU, and "policy-controlled migration" group, the 
pairs from non-EU countries into the EU. The findings support of the predictions of 
the model, that the countries with more generous welfare systems attract higher 
proportions of unskilled migrants in case of free migration but encourage skilled 
migration in case of controlled migration. 
 
1.3 The Data 
 
We use the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS).9 The LIS is a micro-database collected 
from a large range of industrialized countries. It provides demographic, labour 
market, income and expenditure data, both at the household and individual level. At 
the household level, the LIS includes such demographic variables as age, marital 
status, number of income earners in a family, number of children, education, ethnicity, 
migration status, labour force status, etc. Income variables contain gross income, 
disposable income and a detailed classification of social income. This classification is 
appropriate for our analysis of the determinants of immigrant social income since we 
can examine directly the types of benefits that both natives and immigrants receive. 
The database covers twenty-nine countries and its main objective is to provide 
comparable data that can be considered as a reliable source of cross-country analysis. 
                                                 
9 Available at www.lisproject.org 
9 
 The advantage of the LIS is that it provides similar data based on household labour 
force surveys across countries, by transforming the original data files into a 
harmonized LIS data format that contains the same set of standardized variables for 
each country. This allows us to compare the social income of immigrants and natives 
within each country of analysis on one hand, and the effect of household and 
individual characteristics on social income across counties on the other hand. 
In our study we include Norway, Sweden, Belgium, France and the USA for 
the year 2000.10 The choice of countries was determined by the existing welfare 
regimes as described by Esping-Andersen (1990) where the level of generosity of 
social support varies based on differences among the socio-democratic, corporatist 
and liberal welfare systems. We tried to represent each of these systems subject to 
data availability and consistency concerns. Norway and Sweden belong to the 
generous socio-democratic system, Belgium and France are corporate states which 
favour the main bread-earner in the family, while the USA is a liberal state with 
minimal social support. 
We employ annual cross-sectional data for each of these five countries. The 
unit of analysis is an individual in the household context, since some welfare benefits 
are reported only at the household level (particularly those related to means-tested 
cash benefits like housing subsidies, social assistance, unemployment assistance and 
near cash benefits such as food benefits, housing benefits, cash medical benefits, 
heating benefits, etc.).11 An important assumption made in our study, similar to other 
studies e.g. Buchel and Frick (2003), is that families pool resources and share the 
utility of income, derived partly because of the ‘family’ status. Thus, although we 
analyze social income at the individual level, income information in the LIS is 
provided at the household level. In order to normalize the gross social income 
variable, we employ an equivalence scale which takes the square root of the total size 
of the family.12 One of the family members is called by the LIS the ‘head’ of the 
                                                 
10 Data on immigration status is missing or inconsistent for the Netherlands, United Kingdom, 
Germany, Denmark and Italy; the total number of immigrants is too small for Austria (95) and Ireland 
(58). Thus these countries are excluded from the study. 
11 The analysis includes households that receive only social income and those who receive both social 
and wage income. 
12 We also applied the modified OECD equivalence scale, which gives weights of 1.0 to the head, 0.5 
to other adult member, and 0.3 to children. The results were not significantly different. 
10 
 family or the main bread-winner in the family.13 The analysis is based on individuals 
of working age. 
The LIS provides the variable ‘immigrant status’ which shows whether an 
individual is foreign-born or born in the host country. Buchel and Frick (2003) point 
out that defining immigrants as foreign-born is more appropriate than using a citizen-
based immigration definition since it avoids the differences in country-specific 
citizenship legislation. Borjas and Hilton (1996), Shields and Price (1998) and Bell 
(1997) also employ this definition of immigrant status. However, the definition of the 
immigrant status does not provide information on the country of origin. That is why 
we use ‘ethnicity’ status in our analysis, which defines the country of origin and 
allows us to make a clear distinction between EU and non-EU migrants.14 The LIS 
does not offer information on the number of years since migrants’ arrival in the host 
country which is a weak point. However, in our analysis we consider families who 
receive social income support, which indicates that the head of the family has spent at 
least 2 or 3 years in the host country (depending on eligibility criteria in different 
countries). 
The variable social income requires a clear definition since there is no 
harmonized social system across the EU and each country is free to define differently 
the eligibility criteria and the components of its social protection program.15 The 
social income variable provided by the LIS and used in our study includes all possible 
types of social expenditure by the government (social retirement benefits, child and 
family benefits, unemployment compensation, sick pay, accident pay, disability pay, 
maternity pay, means-tested cash benefits, near-cash benefits, etc.) apart from 
pensions and labour income. In our paper we use gross social income since in some 
countries benefits are taxed and in others they are not (Cornelisse and Goudswaard, 
2002). 
 
 
                                                 
13 In most of the countries a large majority of the heads of households are male. Therefore, the results 
are similar to those received when male heads are considered only. However, the sample is not split 
between male and female heads since the observations for female migrant heads are too low across 
most countries.   
14 We compare to what extent the variables immigrant status and ethnicity overlap for each country. We 
find that for all countries the number of foreign-born is the same as the number of individuals assigned 
with ethnicity different than that of natives. 
15 Benefits may be provided by public and /or market institutions. Still market provisions could be 
regulated by the government so that they are equivalent to public provision. 
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 1.4 Descriptive Analysis 
 
1.4.1  Raw Social Income Gaps 
 
Table 1 summarizes the average social income of the family head (in US dollars - 
base year 2000) for the EU, non-EU migrants and natives. It is constructed by 
adjusting the annual household social income with the household size using the 
equivalence scale specified earlier. On average Sweden turns out to be the country 
with the highest social income expenditure with respect to all the groups (EU, non-EU 
immigrants and natives) in the sample, followed by Belgium, France, Norway and the 
US.16 We test whether the social income gaps between the EU/non-EU migrants and 
natives are significantly different from zero, since their existence would allow us to 
explore further how certain socio-economic individual and family characteristics 
could explain these differentials. The table shows that for all the countries, the gap 
between the non-EU migrants and natives is highly significant and is in favour of the 
migrants except for USA where natives receive higher social income than immigrants. 
Belgium, Sweden and the US exhibit a large social income gap of 50%, decreases to 
36% in the case of France and falls to 30% in Norway. The welfare gap in the US is 
52 % in favour of natives. 
The social income gap between non-EU immigrants and natives is 
substantially larger than that between EU migrants and natives. The latter is 
significant only in Sweden and Norway and represents 22% and 9% in favour of 
immigrants respectively. The existence of large disparities between the social support 
for immigrants (especially non-EU ones) and natives poses the relevant question of 
what determines the existence of these gaps, and to what extent the individual and 
family characteristics of the immigrants and natives could shed light on this 
phenomenon. 
 
1.4.2  Household and Individual Characteristics 
 
Table 2 shows the average demographic characteristics for natives, EU immigrants 
and non- EU immigrants in all countries. The table confirms the differences in 
                                                 
16 We do not consider EU/Non-EU migrants in the US. 
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 personal and household characteristics that other researchers have documented 
(Borjas 1995; Buchel and Frick, 2003; SOPEMI, 2001): compared to natives, 
immigrants are on average younger, live in larger families, have more children and 
fewer income earners in the family. While previous studies confirm this tendency for 
immigrants in general, we observe that it holds mainly for the non-EU immigrants, 
while the EU immigrants exhibit characteristics similar to these of natives. In all 
countries subject to analysis, non-EU immigrants are younger on average than natives 
(for USA all migrants are in one group).  This is not the case for the EU immigrants 
though, since in Sweden, Belgium and France they are only slightly older than the 
locals (the difference is less than a year on average except in France) and thus share 
similar age structure with natives. 
Comparing the household size, we find a similar tendency. The non-EU 
immigrants have larger families than both the natives and the EU immigrants. The 
average non-EU immigrant family consists of four members with the exception of the 
US where the family usually incorporates five persons. On average the non-EU 
families have fewer earners than natives for all counties. France records the lowest 
number of earners (1.21), while USA and Norway have the highest (1.97 and 1.8 
respectively). The tendency of fewer earners in the non-EU immigrants’ family 
increases its chances for receiving higher social income. Similarly to previous studies 
(Borjas, 1995; Hu, 1998), we assume that the number of earners in a family explains a 
substantial part of the social income variation. Another factor that influences the 
family social income is the number of children in a family (Buchel and Frick, 2003; 
Borjas and Hilton, 1996). For all the countries the non-EU immigrants have on 
average more children than locals and the EU migrants. We expect that the number of 
children is positively related to the social income. 
The analysis so far reveals two important patterns. Firstly, our descriptive 
results confirm the existing research studies with respect to the characteristics of the 
non-EU immigrants (Borjas, 1995; Buchel and Frick, 2003; SOPEMI, 2001), they are 
younger, live in bigger families with fewer earners and have more children, while the 
EU immigrants seem to be similar to natives. Secondly, the non-EU immigrants and 
locals differ in their relative social incomes across the welfare regimes in all the 
countries. The social income gaps between the non-EU migrants and natives are 
substantially larger than those between natives and the EU movers. 
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 The current migration literature has paid little attention to the social income of 
EU and non-EU immigrants in the Union. We presume that the differences in the 
social income gaps between EU/non-EU immigrants and natives are to a large extent 
due to different immigration legislation with respect to EU and non-EU migrants 
across different countries. The distinction between EU and non-EU immigrants is an 
important one, since it would allow us to analyze the social income gaps between the 
non-EU immigrants and natives excluding the effect of the EU migrants who share 
similar characteristics with the natives.  
 
1.5 Estimation Methodology 
 
We perform an OLS regression analysis that allows us to ask to what extent social 
income is ’explained’ in each country, and to compare the social income impact of 
each of the explanatory variables. We consider two separate samples namely the EU 
immigrants and natives on one hand, and the non-EU immigrants and natives on the 
other hand.  In order to distinguish between household and individual characteristics 
and see to what extent family characteristics contribute towards explaining the social 
income gap, we estimate two different specifications. The first one includes only the 
household specifics, while the second one accounts for all the characteristics 
simultaneously. The general form of the regression equation is the following: 
 
LnYi = α0 + β0ImmigrantStatusi + β1Agei + β2Agei2 + β3Genderi + 
+ β4Educationi + β5NoWageIncomei + β6Earnersi +  
+ β7Childreni + β8Regioni + εi 
 
where i indicates the EU or non-EU immigrant status. LnY is the social 
income, Immigrant Status is a dummy variable, which equals to one in case of 
immigrant and zero in case of native status. Since EU and non-EU immigrants are 
treated diﬀerently by the host country (law restrictions such as residence, work 
permits, etc.), we consider two separate decompositions: non-EU/natives and 
EU/natives.17 As non-EU immigrants have characteristics that are likely to call for 
                                                 
17 The Chow test rejects the null hypothesis of similar coefficients between regressions that include EU 
and non-EU migrants at 5% confidence level, which justifies the split of the regressions. Furthermore, 
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 higher social income than the natives and the EU immigrants (see Table 2), we expect 
that the size of the social income diﬀerential between natives and non-EU immigrants 
to be larger than that between the EU immigrants and natives. 
 
 The explanatory variables Age, Earners and Children are linear variables 
which can be attributed to immigrants or natives depending on the specification. 
Education is a set of dummy variables, which takes the value of one when the head of 
the family has a college or university degree. No Wage dummy is an indicator variable 
that equals to one if the whole household has zero average gross wage income and 
zero otherwise18. Gender is an indicator variable-one for male and zero for female. 
The Region dummies account for regional specificities across countries. The 
dependent variables are measured in PPP-adjusted U.S. dollars19 and are transformed 
logarithmically. We include the age of the head of the family together with the age 
squared as a regressor in the social income equation in order to control for experience 
even though we acknowledge that this is not a precise measure.20 Assuming that the 
age of the head is positively correlated with the number of children, controlling for 
age serves as an insurance against omitted variable bias. The education variable serves 
as a proxy for the ability of the head of the family. 
We are aware that the exogeneity of the number of earners and the number of 
children in the regression equation may be violated for at least two reasons: there may 
be unobserved factors that affect social income propensities and at the same time, 
social income take-up and fertility decisions may be simultaneously determined. We 
therefore regard our approach more as a correlation analysis rather than as a causal 
one.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
we want to estimate the effect of individual and other characteristics on social income separately for 
EU/non-EU because we expect different sensitivities due to differences in immigration law and benefit 
eligibility. 
18 In the study we assume that the welfare regime does not affect the choice of employment. Rather, we 
want to analyze how the welfare state ‘rewards’ the household in the case all its members are 
unemployed compared to their employed counterparts. Specifically we run probit regressions of the 
choice to work or not on the social income and social-economic characteristics. We document that 
social income’ coefficient estimates are not significant. 
19 OECD Purchasing Power Parities. 
20 We could use the popular approximation for experience, however, the LIS household data does not 
include years of education. 
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 1.6 Regression Analysis 
 
1.6.1  The Role of Non-EU Immigrant Status 
 
The dependent variable of all the regressions in Table 3 is the logarithm of the social 
income of the non-EU immigrants and natives. In the first specification for each 
country we explore the change in the existing gap due to different household 
characteristics. In Sweden the raw gap of 50% is reduced to 18% after including the 
household variables, which suggests that around 36 percentage points of the gap could 
be due to the fact that the immigrants have fewer earners, more children and are more 
likely to have no wage income in the family. Belgium exhibits very similar pattern to 
Sweden and we can see that the family characteristics contribute for closing the social 
income gap from 52% to 24%. In Norway the impact of the household structure is less 
pronounced than in Sweden and Belgium. At most a fifth of the 30% gap or only 6% 
points can be explained by the household characteristics. Shifting our attention to one 
of the largest economies in the EU, we find that the gap between non-EU immigrants 
and natives in France has decreased to 23% and therefore household and individual 
characteristics explain more than half of the social income gap. In the US the natives 
take higher level of social benefits although immigrant families have more children 
but surprisingly they have more earners in a family than the natives. The 52% of 
social income gap is reduced by only 8 percentage points due to the differences in 
family structure. 
The second specification in Table 3 controls simultaneously for the individual 
and household characteristics. In Sweden and Norway the gap increases slightly after 
controlling for age, gender and education of the family head, suggesting that the non-
EU immigrants’ characteristics are not that relevant for receiving higher social 
income. In Belgium and France the tendency is the opposite, namely that after adding 
the individual specifics, the unexplained gap is reduced from 24% to 19% in case of 
Belgium and from 23% to 20% for France. In the US despite the fact that  the gap 
falls from 44% to 30% when accounting for individual characteristics, the natives still 
take more social income than immigrants.  
Overall, in all the countries the household variables prove to be important in 
explaining the social income differential between non-EU immigrants and natives. It 
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 seems that a substantial part of the gap in Sweden, Norway, France and Belgium is 
due to the fact that non-EU immigrants live in families with less earners, have more 
children and are more likely not to have any labour income. The individual 
characteristics are equally important in Belgium and France and of vital importance 
for USA where individuals support their families based on their own merits. 
 
1.6.2  The Role of EU Immigrant Status 
 
It is worth noting that the raw social income gap between the EU immigrants and 
natives is much smaller than the non-EU/natives’ one. In fact, the gap in Belgium and 
France is not significant. This tendency could be explained by the similarity of the 
household structure between natives and the EU immigrants. We perform similar 
estimation of the gap by control- ling first for household variables and then adding the 
individual characteristics. Table 4 shows the results. Approximately half of the gap in 
Sweden, or 9 percentage points, can be accounted for by the higher number of 
children and less earners in EU migrants’ families than those in local ones. The age, 
education and gender of the head do not help much to explain the gap. In Norway, 
both specifications have very small impact on the EU/natives gap since they reduce it 
by only one percentage point. 
In sum, we document that the household and individual characteristics have 
different explanatory contribution for the income gap among EU/Non-EU immigrants 
and natives across countries.  
 
1.6.3  Median Regressions 
 
Many studies on migration suggest that one might face the problem of skewed 
distribution i.e. the immigrant status is likely to have a strong influence on the people 
that appear in the upper part of the social income distribution and much smaller effect 
on the lower tail of the distribution. We perform quantile regressions as a form of 
robustness check to our results based on the OLS regression analysis. Buchinsky 
(1998) points out that the estimated coefficient vector in median regression analysis is 
not sensitive to outliers in the dependent. 
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 Table 5 presents the median regression results of the immigrants’ dummy 
estimates. We control for both individual and household characteristics and estimate a 
specification similar to specification (2) from table 3 and table 4 for non-EU and EU 
immigrants respectively. The coefficient of the non-EU immigrants’ dummy in the 
median regressions for Sweden, Belgium, France and the US is quite similar to that of 
the OLS analysis (0.23 vs. 0.29; 0.20 vs. 0.17; 0.36 vs. 0.36; 0.30 vs. 0.29). The 
difference between the median and OLS estimates is slightly bigger in Norway (0.25 
versus 0.35).21 The social income gap estimates for EU immigrants are not significant 
for France and Belgium using both regression analyses, while for Norway the median 
estimate is higher (0.08 vs. 0.19) than the OLS one. Overall, the median and OLS 
estimates are very similar which confirms that the results are not driven by outliers. 
 
1.6.4  Decomposing the Social Income Gap 
 
Using the results from columns (2) of Tables 3 and 4, we calculate the Oaxaca-
Blinder mean social income. This method decomposes the overall gap into a part that 
is due to differences in observable factors (age, gender, education, wage income 
dummy, number of earners, and number of children) and a part that remains 
unexplained. We run separate OLS regressions for natives, EU and non-EU 
immigrants, and then we describe the social income gap as written below: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) *'*'*' ˆˆ βββββ njnnjjnj XXXXLnYLnY −+−+−=−  
 
where j denotes EU/non-EU immigrants and n denotes natives, LnY  is the 
immigrants/natives mean of the natural logarithm of social income, and X  represents 
the respective vectors of mean values of explanatory variables for immigrants and 
natives. Finally,  is the corresponding vector of estimated coefficients and  
represents the non-discriminatory welfare effect obtained from the pooled sample of 
immigrants and natives.
βˆ *β
22 The first two terms are the part of the gap that remains 
                                                 
21 We do not perform an analysis of the median social income, since Oaxaca-Blinder assume 
decomposition of the average incomes. 
22 In the original approaches developed by Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973), it is assumed that the 
wage structure (in this paper the social income structure) of the advantageous group (non-EU 
immigrants) would prevail in the absence of discrimination, i.e., β* = βn . However, later research 
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 ‘unexplained” and the third term is due to diﬀerences in observable characteristics. 
The unexplained part can be due to diﬀerences in unobservable time-invariant 
characteristics, coined as ‘immigration eﬀect” (Riphahn, 2004). As pointed by 
Brücker et al. (2002) a number of reasons can explain the presence of such eﬀect: self 
selection (immigrants’ unobserved characteristics make them more likely choose a 
host country with more generous welfare benefits), migration-specific eﬀects 
(psychological trauma could make immigrants more dependent on welfare), network 
eﬀects and reduced wages (exclusion from certain high paid jobs that leads to lower 
salary and hence more social welfare receipt). 
The decomposition of non-EU immigrants/natives’ log social income 
differential is presented in Table 6, row (1). The first row lists unadjusted social 
income gaps for each country. Row (2) shows the “unexplained” gap that remains 
after controlling for individual and household characteristics. Row (3) presents the 
gap that is attributable to uneven distribution of observables between non-EU 
immigrants and natives. Large portion of the gaps in Sweden, Belgium, France and 
the US is due to observable factors which account for 57%, 63%, 58% and 55% 
respectively. Norway which is not an EU member but participates in the European 
Free Trade Association exhibits quite different pattern since the observable 
characteristics account for only 26% of the gap. 
Looking at the impact of the household characteristics (row 5), the family 
structure plays an important role in Sweden, Norway, France and Belgium where 67 
percent, 43 percent, 29 percent and 47 percent of the gaps are explained. Among all 
household variables, the number of earners and number of children are the two most 
important factors in explaining the social income gap in all the countries. 
The diﬀerences of individual characteristics between non-EU immigrants and 
natives are not important to explain the social income diﬀerential in Sweden and 
Norway (row 6). In fact, the results suggest that non-EU immigrants have 
characteristics that prevent them from receiving benefits compared to natives. This is 
not the case in Belgium, France and the US where individual characteristics are 
responsible for 33 percent, 11 percent and 42 percent of the gap respectively. The 
                                                                                                                                            
suggests that this assumption is ad hoc and Neumark (1988), Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) advance the 
idea that the non-discriminatory productivity factor estimates fall between the two groups; hence, they 
are the weighted average of each group’s social income. 
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 negative sign of the values of the social income gap in the USA indicates that the 
natives take higher social income than the immigrants. Regarding the individual 
characteristics the factor age is crucial for the natives to get high social income in the 
US. 
The welfare gap can be reduced through immigration policy (e.g., skill-based 
admission criteria) and/or change of eligibility rules. Assuming that immigrants have 
not altered significantly their family structure and levels of education after arriving in 
the host country, the results imply that Norway and Sweden have attracted non-EU 
immigrants with similar individual profile as that of natives so that it does not seem to 
explain diﬀerence in welfare receipt. While in Belgium, France and the US, individual 
disparities drive a substantial part of the gap. To close the social income gap in 
Belgium and France, the policy makers may have to focus on reducing the disparities 
of individual factors, for example, by more favourable skill-based selection of 
immigrants at the point of entry. However, the implementation of such policy rule 
may oﬀset the potential benefits of migration as an inflow of more mobile labor force 
than natives that can attenuate potential shocks to unemployment. 
If the immigrants in Sweden and Norway have increased their level of 
education after arrival to the host country than instead of a change in the immigration 
policy, the disparity may be reduced through change in eligibility based on household 
characteristics. Potentially, such a rule will not make presumably assimilated migrants 
to leave the country and thus oﬀset the positive eﬀect of migrant inflows. 
The “unexplained” part of the gap varies across countries (see row 2 of Table 
6). In Norway it accounts for two thirds of the gap, while in Belgium it is reduced to 
one third of it. It may be the case that a time-invariant unobserved factor such as 
preference to migrate to more generous countries, language and network eﬀects play a 
role. There is evidence that low skilled migrants may choose their host country based 
on its welfare generosity (Giorgi and Pellizzari, 2009; Cohen and Razin, 2008; Razin 
and Sadka, 2004). The cross-country heterogeneity of the unexplained part of the gap 
highlights that diﬀerences in welfare provisions are still present. 
Finally, Table 7 shows the results for the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the 
log social income gap between the EU immigrants and natives. Sweden and Norway 
are the only two countries for which the gaps are significantly different from zero. 
The values of the income gaps in both countries are substantially smaller than their 
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 counterparts in table 6. This supports the premise that the EU immigrants are similar 
to natives, a fact suggested also by the descriptive analysis earlier on. The observable 
characteristics in Sweden and Norway account for respectively 36% and 22% of their 
social income gaps (row 2). 
 
1.7 Concluding remarks 
 
While there is extensive research on welfare migration, the social income differences 
among EU/non-EU immigrants and natives remain unexplored. The main goal of this 
paper is to find out whether natives and immigrants’ social income differs within a 
country and across groups of countries. We document, in accordance with previous 
studies that non-EU immigrants tend to be younger, live in larger families with fewer 
earners and more children than native families. EU immigrants share similar 
characteristics with natives. Social income gaps between non-EU immigrants and 
natives are larger than those between EU immigrants and natives. The USA exhibits a 
very different tendency by providing natives with higher social income than 
immigrants. Overall, we find that the wage income, the number of earners in the 
family and the presence of children are the main factors for the existence of the social 
income gap between natives and non-EU immigrants. 
The main finding of this paper is that in Sweden and Norway, a large part of 
the non- EU immigrants/natives’ social income gap is explained by the family 
characteristics, while in Belgium and France family and individual characteristics play 
an important role as well. The US provides higher social income to natives which is 
mainly based on individual characteristics. We contribute to the literature by 
decomposing the sources of the actual social income gap using LIS data for the year 
2000. Previous studies examine the probability of welfare receipt which does not 
allow to quantify the contribution of each factor. 
Our results have policy implications for reducing welfare gaps. In Belgium, 
France and the US, policy makers may reduce the gap by more favourable selection of 
immigrants at the point of entry such that the level of education of immigrants is 
similar to the natives’ level of education. 
Since the gap is driven only by diﬀerences in household characteristics in 
Sweden and Norway, policies limiting eligibility based on the number of earners and 
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 children may be applied. The optimal policy, however, demands that a cost-benefit 
analysis be performed that estimates not only the welfare costs of immigrants but also 
the related benefits. 
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1.A Appendix 
Table 1. Summary Statistics for the Annual Average Social Family Income 
 
 
Non-EU/Natives Gap  EU/Natives Gap 
 
  
Non-EU 
Immigrants 
 
Natives Abs. 
Gap
Rawc 
Gap
EU 
Immigrants
Natives 
 
Abs. 
Gap 
Raw 
Gap
 
 
Sweden 
 
 
6808 
 
 
5012 
 
1796
 
0.50
 
6116
 
5012 
 
 
1104 
 
0.22
 (4033)a (4731) (0.00)b (0.00) (5627) (4731) (0.00) (0.00)
 
Norway 
 
5018 
 
3652 1366 0.31 4000 3652 
 
348 0.09 
 (4571) (4355) (0.00) (0.00) (4193) (4355) (0.10) (0.05)
 
Belgium 
 
6097 
 
4269 1827.42 0.52 4678.73 4270 
 
409 0.13 
 (3994) (4623) (0.03) (0.00) (3975) (4623) (0.52) (0.23)
 
France 
 
5294 
 
3862 1432 0.36 4129 4362 
 
-233 -0.05 
 (4583.61) (6843.24) (0.00) (0.00) (6478.41) (6843.24) (0.30) (0.58)
 
USAd 
 
2741 
 
4127 -1386 -0.52 
    
 (4715) (4937) (0.00) (0.00)     
Source : The data is from the Luxembourg Income Study for 2000. 
Notes : a Standard Errors in Parentheses; b P-value for the gap in sample means between non-EU and natives, 
and EU and natives; c  The gap is reported in log points; Social income are reported in U.S. dollars; d We do 
not distinguish between EU/Non-EU immigrants. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Natives, EU and Non-EU Immigrants by Country 
 
 
Sweden  Norway  Belgium  France  USA 
 
  
EU Non-EU 
Natives Immigr.  Immigr. 
EU Non-EU 
Natives Immigr.  Immigr. 
EU Non-EU 
Natives Immigr.  Immigr. 
EU Non-EU 
Natives Immigr.  Immigr. 
 
 
Natives  Immigr. 
 
 
Age of Family Head   42.6   43.06  37.9 
(10.51) (9.75) (8.77) 
 
 
Household Size   3.32   3.33  3.69 
(1.38) (1.36) (1.71) 
 
 
Number of Earners  1.93   1.76  1.36 
(0.87) (0.89) (0.93) 
 
 
Number of Children  1.33   1.4  1.8 
(1.2)  (1.23) (1.47) 
 
 
Observations  7258  200  189 
 
42.06   41.03   40.04 
(10.92)  (10.16) (9.75) 
 
 
3.14   3.51   3.71 
(1.45)  (1.63) (1.75) 
 
 
1.97   1.84   1.8 
(0.95)  (0.93) (1.06) 
 
 
1.14   1.45   1.6 
(1.19)  (1.34) (1.41) 
 
 
10320  579  466 
 
43.64   48.24   42.30 
(9.25)  (9.15) (8.15) 
 
 
3.63   3.63   4.13 
(1.31)  (1.40) (1.31) 
 
 
1.66   1.22   1.63 
(0.89)  (1.00) (1.10) 
 
 
1.42   1.21   1.78 
(1.24)  (1.25) (1.04) 
 
 
1390  98  80 
 
43.67   46.67   44.17 
(11.71)  (11.59) (10.92) 
 
 
2.70   2.92   3.62 
(1.34)  (1.28) (2.06) 
 
 
1.46   1.42   1.21 
(0.86)  (0.96) (0.84) 
 
 
0.75   0.85   1.45 
(1.03)  (0.68) (1.53) 
 
 
7224  185  267 
 
41.76   37.72 
(12.02) (10.29) 
 
 
3.72   4.81 
(1.75) (2.00) 
 
 
1.75   1.97 
(1.08) (1.19) 
 
 
1.48   2.09 
(1.45) (1.6) 
 
 
14953  1793 
Source: The data is from the Luxembourg Income Study for 2000. 
Notes: All means are weighted with the LIS sampling weight and include heads of families between 18-60 years 
28 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Estimated Social Income Gaps for the Non-EU Immigrants and Natives 
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Sweden 
  
Norway 
  
France 
  
Belgium
  
USA 
 
 
Independent variables
 
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
 
Non-EU Immigranta
 
 
0.18*** 
 
0.23*** 
 
0.24*** 
 
0.25*** 
 
0.23*** 
 
0.20** 
 
0.24** 
 
0.20* 
 
-0.44***
 
-0.30*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.11) (0.05) (0.11) (0.04) (0.05) 
No-Wage Dummyb 0.48*** 0.38*** 0.83*** 0.59*** 0.56*** 0.19*** 0.90*** 0.58*** 0.73*** 0.55*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.51) (0.05) (0.12) (0.11) (0.04) (0.05) 
Number of Earners -0.36*** -0.36*** -0.29*** -0.26*** -0.47*** -0.38*** -0.30*** -0.37*** -0.13*** -0.12*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) 
Number of Children 0.14*** 0.21*** 0.07*** 0.21*** -0.01 0.19*** -0.003 0.18*** -0.1*** -0.03** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) 
Age of Family Head  -0.04***  -0.09***  -0.17***  -0.10***  -0.05*** 
  ( 0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01) 
Age of Family Head Squared  0.001***  0.001***  0.002***  0.002***  0.001*** 
 
Female Family Headc 
 (0.0001) 
-0.18***
 (0.0001) 
-0.45***
 (0.0001) 
-0.23***
 (0.0002) 
-0.40***
 (0.0001) 
-0.36*** 
  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.08)  (0.03) 
Education Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Region Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
R2 
 
0.13 0.17 0.16 0.25 0.25 0.37 0.32 0.44 0.09 0.14 
Number of observations 7 447 
bour
7 417 
e
7 961 
 Study for 2000 
7 961 5 222 5 222 1 308 1 308 16 746 16 746 
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Source : The data is from Luxem g Incom
Notes : *** Statistically significant at the 0.01 level; ** at the 0.05 level; * at the 0.10 level; aNative is the reference group; b Non-zero 
family income is the reference group; c Male is the reference group. 
 
 
 
 
       Table 4. Estimated Social Income Gap for the EU Immigrants and Natives 
 
  
Sweden 
  
Norway 
  
France
  
Belgium
 
Independent variables (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
EU Immigranta 
 
0.13*** 
 
0.14*** 
 
0.06 
 
0.08* 
 
-0.05 
 
-0.09 
 
-0.03 
 
0.03 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.57) (0.26) (0.15) (0.13) 
No-Wage Dummyb 0.55*** 0.43*** 0.86*** 0.61***   0.99 0.67 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)   (0.11) (0.10) 
Number of Earners -0.36*** -0.36*** -0.29*** -0.26***   -0.51*** -0.21***
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)   (0.04) (0.05) 
Number of Children 0.14*** 0.22*** 0.07*** 0.21***   0.02 0.19*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)   (0.03) (0.03) 
Age of Family Head  -0.04***  -0.10***    -0.10***
  (0.01)  (0.01)    (0.02) 
Age of Family Head Squared  0.001***  0.001***    0.001***
Female Family Headc 
 (0.0001) 
-0.18
 (0.0001) 
-0.47***
   (0.0002) 
-0.43***
  (0.03)  (0.04)    (0.08) 
Education Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Region Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.13 0.17 0.16 0.25 0.31 0.37 0.31 0.39 
Number of observations 7458 7434 8 022 8 022 5125 5125 1294 1294 
25
Source : The data is from the Luxembourg Income Study for 2000 
Notes : *** Statistically significant at the 0.01 level; ** at the 0.05 level; * at the 0.10 level; a Native is the reference group; b Non-zero income family 
is the reference group; c Male is the reference group. 
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         Table 5. Robustness Check - Median Regressions 
 
 
 
Sweden 
 
Norway
 
France 
 
Belgium
 
USA 
 
 
Non-EU 
 0.29
***
 
0.35**
* 
(0 06)
 
0.36**
* 
(0 14)
 
0.17* 
(0.09) 
 
-
0.29*** 
(0 04) 
EU  0.05 0.19*** -0.08 0.11  
(0.11) (0.05) (0.12) (0.09)  
Source : The data is from the Luxembourg Income Study for 2000 
Notes : The table presents immigrant-dummy (native is the reference group) estimates 
from a series of regressions controlling simultaneously for individual and family 
characteristics; *** Statistically significant at the 0.01 level; ** at the 0.05 level;* at 
the 0.10 level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 6. Decomposition of Non-EU Immigrants and Natives’ Social Income Gapa 
 
  
Sweden
 
Norway
 
 
Belgium 
 
 
France
 
USA 
 
 
Raw Social Income Gapb 
 
0.501 
 
0.309 
 
 
0.520 
 
 
0.361 
 
-0.524
 
Unexplained Gap 0.220 0.230 
 
0.191 
 
0.145 -0.230
Explained Contribution 0.285 0.078 0.328 0.206 -0.290
Relative Contribution (%) 57 25 63 58 55 
 
Effect of Household and Individual Characteristics
     
 
Household 0.334 0.133 
 
0.151 
 
0.168 -0.063
Number of Earners 0.192 0.054 0.157 0.076 -0.024
Number of Children 0.090 0.067 -0.016 0.087 -0.015
No-Wage Dummy 0.057 0.018 0.001 0.005 -0.018
Individual -0.050 -0.054 0.176 0.04 -0.229
Notes: a The table reports the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the log annual social income gap. The effect of age, age squared, 
gender, education and region is not reported; b The positive gap indicates that the non-EU immigrants’ social income is higher than 
that for natives. 
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            Table 7. Decomposition of EU Immigrants and Natives’ Social Income Gapa 
 
  
Sweden
 
 
Norway 
 
 
Raw Social Income Gapb 
 
0.220 
 
 
0.090 
 
Unexplained Gap 0.140 
 
0.070 
Explained Gap 0.080 0.018 
Relative Contribution (%) 36 20 
 
Effect of Household and Individual Characteristics
  
 
Household 0.066 
 
0.088 
Number of Earners 0.061 0.039 
Number of Children 0.000 0.057 
No-Wage Dummy 0.015 0.005 
Individual 0.011 -0.067 
Notes: a The table reports Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the log annual social income gap.  
The effect of age, age squared, gender, education and region is not reported; b The positive gap 
indicates that EU immigrants social income is higher. 
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 Definition of variables 
 
AGE—The number of head years at the moment of interview. Only heads of family 
between 18 and 60 years old are included. 
GENDER—Indicates whether the head of the family is male or female. 
HOUSEHOLD SIZE—It gives the total number of persons in household (includes 
children or any other individuals not included in individual-level survey). 
EDUCATION LEVEL—Whenever possible this variable gives the highest attained 
level of education. We have created a dummy variable taking value of one whenever 
the individual has college or university degree. 
REGION—Includes the region of residence (state, province, district, etc.). For 
countries within the EU, the NUTS-classification is used whenever the coding in the 
original dataset allows for it (usually NUTS 2 or 3). 
ETHNICITY—The content of this variable is not uniform. Preferably it includes 
ethnicity or nationality, but if this information is not available in the original survey, 
it can also contain country of birth, race, ancestry or mother tongue. 
IMMIGRATION STATUS—Shows whether an individual is born in the country or 
has an immigrant background, how recently he/she arrived or other immigration 
status information as available. 
NUMBER OF CHILDREN UNDER AGE 18—The LIS avoids to include married 
children under age eighteen. The head and spouse under eighteen are also excluded. 
NUMBER OF EARNERS—An individual is considered an earner if he/she receives 
any labor income. 
FAMILY WAGE INCOME—Includes any cash wage and salary income including 
employer bonuses, 13th month bonus, etc. It is recorded gross of employee social 
insurance contributions/taxes but net of employer social insurance 
contributions/taxes. In our study we create a dummy variable which takes value of 
one if the family wage income is zero. 
SOCIAL INCOME—Includes all of the following variables: 
Social Retirement Benefits (cash social security benefits for old age an/or survivors, 
i.e., widows/widowers) 
Child or family Allowances (cash payments for child or family allowances not 
relating to maternity/paternity) 
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Unemployment Compensation (non-means tested cash social insurance benefits in 
case of unemployment where severance pay is excluded) 
Sick pay (cash benefits due to short-term sickness or non-occupational injury, and 
related medical benefits and services) 
Accident pay (cash accidents or injury payments) 
Disability pay (cash benefits for partial or total permanent disability, i.e. long term 
illness) 
Maternity pay (cash payments for maternity or paternity) 
Military/Veteran/War Benefits (cash veteran’s benefit or military benefits for old 
age, military disability and war separations) 
Other Social Insurance (other cash or near cash benefits that are not included in the 
more specific cash benefit variables) 
Means-Tested Cash Benefits (means-tested benefits or so called “emergency” 
benefits. LIS includes also mandatory cash transfers NOT tied to some form of in-
kind benefit, e.g. not tied to food or education) 
Near-Cash Benefits (all forms of transfers that are, in a strict sense, in-kind 
payments, i.e. they are tied to a specific requirement such as school attendance, but 
have a cash equivalent value equal or nearly equal to the market value, including 
near-cash housing benefits) Alimony or Child Support (alimony received from non-
household members) 
Other Regular Private Income (regular cash private transfers) 
 
 Chapter 2 
 
Are Immigrants Paid Less for Education? ∗ 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The relationship between education and its impact on earnings has been explored 
extensively by many economists. Accounting for the earning differential between 
migrant and native workers based on their schooling, however, is still relevant and an 
interesting research topic for both practitioners and policy makers given the flexible and 
highly competitive labour markets of the developed economies. Different educational 
systems across countries pose a real challenge for policy makers in recognizing the 
educational degrees and technical skills of foreign-born workers in their countries. This 
may lead to foreign-born workers being employed in occupations where the average 
level of education across employed workers is higher or lower than their own education 
level, which could translate into a potential mis-match in earnings between natives and 
migrants. 
Duncan and Hoffman (1981) started the literature by distinguishing between an 
individual’s actual years of schooling and the ‘typical’ years of schooling prevailing in a 
certain job. Studies based on US data (e.g., Chiswick, 1980; Duncan and Hoffman, 
1981; Cohn and Khan, 1995) suggest that the rate of return (impact on earnings) to 
‘typical’ schooling is positive across occupations and exceeds that of over-education, 
while the return to under-education is negative.  
This type of an analysis has been also applied to understanding why immigrants 
typically face lower returns to education compared to natives. Chiswick & Miller (2005) 
imply that the partial effect of an additional year of schooling on earnings for foreign-
born workers in the USA is 2.5 percentage points lower than that for natives. Potential 
                                                 
∗ I would like to thank Štěpán Jurajda, Ira Gang, Randall Filer, Alexandru Chirmiciu and Michael Jetton 
for their valuable suggestions and comments. This research has been supported by a grant from the 
CERGE-EI Foundation under a program of the Global Development Network. All opinions expressed are 
those of the author and have not been endorsed by CERGE-EI or the GDN.  
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 explanations for this phenomenon are that either human capital skills are not fully 
transferable across borders or that a year of schooling has a different human capital 
content across countries. Alternatively, migrants may face barriers in the labour market 
that result in fewer opportunities to find a job and thus may receive wages below their 
marginal productivity. One such example is work permits linked to specific job 
positions or geographical areas as in the case of the temporary restricted free movement 
of labour with respect to the countries that joined the European Union in 2004 and 
2007.23 
A number of studies confirm the above premises and document an increase in 
the dispersion of labour market outcomes across immigrants examining data for Canada, 
Germany, Portugal and UK.24 However, recent evidence from large EU economies is 
not available, which makes further research on the topic necessary and important in 
view of recent and future EU expansions and in view of recent large migration flows 
towards the developed Western labour markets. Furthermore, gathering evidence on the 
extent to which potential educational mis-matches occur between years of schooling and 
the ‘typical’ years of schooling prevailing in a certain occupation and its impact on 
earnings across natives and migrants in different countries could shed further light on 
the effectiveness of immigration policies across countries. A comparison between the 
educational returns to earnings of migrants versus natives subject to the conservative 
immigration policy of France, Germany, and Austria (analysed in this paper) on the one 
hand and the less restrictive immigration and integration policy of the UK and US (data 
and estimates based on already existing but comparative research) on the other will 
provide valuable insight into the success of these immigration policies and how well 
integrated migrants are across countries.25 
In this paper, I therefore extend the existing evidence of educational returns to 
earnings for natives and immigrants, by focusing on three European economies, 
Germany, France and Austria, which are characterized by substantial immigration flows 
during the last 40 years. By 1993, the total number of non-EU residents in the 
                                                 
23 See Refugees, Recent Migrants and Employment, Challenging Barriers and Exploring Pathways 
(2008), edited by Sonya McKay, Routledge Economics 
24 See Baker and Benjamin (1994); Chiswick (1980); Kiker & Santos (1991); and Dustmann (1993). 
Groot and Maasen van den Brink (2000) provide a survey of the literature. 
25 See “Immigration policy and the welfare system” (2002) edited by T. Boeri, H. H. Hanson, and B. 
McCormick ; and see also Entorf & Minoiu (2005).   
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 Community had reached 12 million. Of these migrants, one-quarter were Turks, who 
mainly resided in Germany and another quarter from North Africa were residing in 
France. In 2003, the number of legally resident foreigners in Germany was 7.3 million, 
who comprised 8.9 percent of the total population, while France had 4.9 million 
immigrants representing roughly 8.1 percent of its population. The analysis (regression 
estimates) on France, Germany, and Austria, characterised by a rather conservative 
labour market access to immigrants, is compared further to those by previous studies on 
migrants’ earnings in the USA (Chiswick & Miller, 2007) and in the UK (Lindley & 
Linton, 2006), exhibiting a more flexible labour market access.26 
The data are drawn from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), which 
transforms the original data files into a harmonized LIS data format, synchronizes 
definitions and labour market concepts, and makes all dataset variables comparable 
across different countries. This allows for an easy and robust comparison of the impact 
of years of education on the earnings of native and immigrant workers across the 
economies of Germany, France, and Austria27, which differ both in the size and 
composition of their migrant populations as well as in their migration policies over time. 
The decomposition of the actual years of schooling variable into ‘typical’ education (the 
actual years of schooling match the years of schooling prevailing usually across 
occupations); over-education (the actual years of schooling higher than those typical 
across occupations); and under-education (the actual years of schooling lower than 
those typical across occupations) will provide an insight into the overall gap in payoffs 
to schooling. 
 I find no significant difference in the impact of ‘typical’ education on earnings 
between native and migrant workers in all countries of analysis, which shows that there 
is no additional reward in earnings in the case of natives compared to foreign workers. 
However, foreign-born workers find it slightly more difficult to find employment in 
occupations matching their level of education. Furthermore, the return to usual years of 
schooling that prevail amongst workers across different occupations is higher and 
statistically different than that for actual years of education for both native and foreign- 
born workers in all countries. However, compared to natives, foreign-born workers have 
                                                 
26 See Boeri et al. (2002) and M. Caldeira, J. Castello, A. Esteves, A. Ferrer, M. Fonseca, J. Jamin, H. 
Koff, A. Lostia, J. Malheiros, I. Molina, E. Tricada and J. van der Leun  (1999). 
27 The choice of countries is based on availability of data  
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 lower returns to over-education, which drive the gap in earnings between natives and 
the foreign-born. This could potentially be the evidence for differences in the ‘quality’ 
of education between native and foreign-born employees. Foreign-born workers find it 
more difficult to find jobs matching their education and may also face lower earnings 
than natives for similar levels of education beyond the prevailing level in a given 
occupation. 
Differences in immigration policies with respect to labour market access do not 
play a role while comparing the educational returns of native and migrant workers who 
have found a position perfectly corresponding to their education. The gap between 
educational returns of natives and workers across all countries in this case is non-
existent. However, France, Germany, and Austria reward their native workers more than 
they reward immigrants in the case where these workers have more years of schooling 
than that typical of workers in their occupation. In contrast, the UK and the US do not 
differentiate between migrant and native workers in rewarding over-education. 
 
2.2 Theoretical Background  
 
2.2.1 Over-education/Under-education Theories  
Hartog (2000) and Kiker, Santos, and Mendes De Oliveira, (1997) outline four different 
interpretations of the over/under-education phenomena: (i) a search and match 
framework in an environment of imperfect information, (ii) the human capital 
framework, (iii) the hedonic/assignment framework and (iv) the technological change 
framework. 
Search and Match theory focuses on the existence of an ‘educational mis-match’ 
due to imperfect labour market information. This mis-match is only a temporary phase 
since it is directly related to the individual’s age and experience on the labour market. 
Workers with a given level of education search to improve their job level and move in 
cases where the offer is better than their current position overtime. Thus, the incidence 
of over-education falls with increasing age and experience and the incidence of under-
education at the same time decreases. The searching and matching interpretation is very 
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 likely to explain the initial educational mis-match of migrants whose qualifications were 
not recognized by the host country and who progress into better jobs over time. 
Human Capital theory suggests that over-education results from the individual’s 
choice of accepting a lower-level job in his early years of experience since it is a good 
investment opportunity. Sicherman (1991) shows that workers who have higher 
education than that ‘typical’ for the job are more likely to move to higher level 
occupations. This theory is supported by Alba-Ramirez (1993) who finds that over-
educated workers are more likely to move to better occupations, while under-educated 
workers move to a similar job position within their occupation. The lack of international 
transferability of skills and the fact that a year of schooling for migrants could be 
different than a year of schooling for natives are among the reasons of why migrants 
could appear to be over-educated or under-educated, while in fact they are correctly 
matched with respect their actual schooling.   
The Assignment Theory represented by the Sattinger (1993) paper for example, 
focuses on measuring the match between assigned heterogeneous workers to 
heterogeneous jobs. Within the general hedonic model, a job is characterized by a fixed 
level of ‘typical’ education, and individuals with varying levels of education might be 
assigned to this job. Equilibrium could be achieved by the free interaction of the 
demand for labour expressed as job requirements and the supply for labour expressed as 
workers applying for a particular job. For a given job level, the reward to attained 
education reflects the value of this particular education to the employer in the shape of 
an iso-profit curve. This curve is expected to be concave, or, in other words, the 
negative impact on earnings (penalty) of under-education should be larger than the 
positive impact on earnings (reward) of over-education. In general, returns to education 
depend on the specificities of the job, and the earnings difference between workers with 
different education varies due to the success of the assignment or the match. 
The Technological Change Framework is to be found in Kiker et al. (2000) and 
suggests that the skills an individual acquires at school should be constantly improved 
so that they match and keep up with the technological changes in a country. Thus, these 
graduates will be more educated than their co-workers once they find a job. The 
employers are not able to hire immediately all those better educated workers, and hence, 
the existing workers will become in reality under-educated. Once the job requirements 
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 evolve, however, so that they reflect the skills and education of the newly hired 
graduates, these graduates will be considered over-educated with respect to those who 
are already on the job. According to this theory, for a given level of education 
immigrants from less-developed countries have an education that is based on a more 
distant technology than the developed economies and therefore are more likely to report 
that they are over-educated compared to immigrants from developed economies in an 
attempt to secure a job position. 
In summary, according to both the Search and Match theory and the Human 
Capital theory, the incidence of under- and over-education diminishes over time with 
higher age and accumulated experience by individuals. While the first theory predicts 
that both over- and under-education occur less with the increasing of an individual’s age 
and experience, the latter suggests that over-educated workers are likely to progress to 
better occupations compared to under-educated workers, who often move across similar 
positions within the same occupation. The Assignment theory predicts a higher earnings 
penalty of under-education compared to the over-education reward on earnings, while 
the Technological Change theory claims that immigrants from less-developed 
economies are more frequently over-educated compared to immigrants from developed 
economies. 
 
2.2.2 Over-education/Under-education measurement and the existing 
literature 
The positive relationship between education and earnings is well acknowledged by the 
economics literature. While the human capital models of Becker (1964) and Mincer 
(1974) assume that the education of a worker is fully utilized by his current occupation, 
the job competition model developed by Thurow (1975) suggests a more complicated 
relationship between education and earnings, which still advocates, however, a rigid 
structural view of jobs. Proponents of the latter view claim since the job market 
allocation is based on existing surpluses/shortages between individuals and jobs, some 
workers are likely to possess higher or lower education and skills than those typical in 
their job. Under this assumption, each occupation is characterized by a ‘typical’ level of 
education that is needed for a satisfactory job performance (see Kiker et al., 1997; 
Hartog, 2000). Any worker’s education above this ‘typical’ level is known as “over-
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 education” and any education below the ‘typical’ level of education is “under-
education”.  
An important issue in the literature on over-education and under-education is 
how the ‘typical’ schooling is measured. There are three possible approaches regarding 
that issue depending on the perspective of defining the ‘typical’ education for a certain 
job: the job analysis approach, the worker self-assessment approach, and the realized-
matches approach.28 According to the job analysis approach, the ‘typical’ level of 
education is specified for the different job titles across occupations by professional job 
analysts. Rumberger (1987) provides the empirical evidence for the above approach by 
using the US Dictionary of Occupational Titles and finds that over-educated workers in 
the US have lower rates of return than workers with the ‘typical’ level of education. 
The worker self-assessment approach uses the information provided by the 
worker himself on what level of education is ‘typical’ in a certain occupation, or what is 
the typical minimum level of education required to perform the current job 
satisfactorily. This approach is used by Duncan and Hoffman (1981), who confirm the 
results of Rumberger (1981) based on US data. Daly, Buchel and Duncan  (2000) also 
employ the worker self-assessment approach in comparing the returns to over-education 
and under-education between the US and Germany and find that for both countries, 
surplus education receives a wage premium, while deficit education suffers a wage 
penalty. 
The third method of realized matches, which I use in this paper, postulates that 
‘typical’ education is indicated by the actual schooling of the workers in a particular 
occupation measured by the mean or the mode of that distribution. Any schooling that is 
above the mode/mean years of schooling for a certain occupation is considered to be 
over-education, and any schooling below the ‘typical’ education is respectively under-
education. A comparison of the benefits and drawbacks of all three approaches is given 
by Hartog (2000).29 He performs analyses using all three approaches and concludes that 
the results are not sensitive to the approach employed to measure ‘typical’ education. 
                                                 
28 For a detailed explanation of the three approaches see Hartog (2000). 
29 Though the realized matches approach has its drawbacks, the job analysis approach could give biased 
evaluations if the actual years of schooling of workers across occupations are used, rather than the typical 
education for a particular type of job.  
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 Verdugo and Verdugo (1989) use the mean and the standard deviation of 
schooling based on the 1980 US census as a benchmark for the ‘typical’ level of 
education. They find that over-educated workers earn less than their either adequately 
educated or under-educated counterparts and claim that the returns to over-schooling are 
negative. Cohn and Kahn (1995) replicate the analysis by Verdugo and Verdugo (1989) 
and Sicherman (1991) using the 1985 wave of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. 
While Verdugo and Verdugo (1989) claim that the returns to over-education are 
negative, Cohn and Kahn (1995) conclude that the returns to over-education are positive 
and those to under-education are negative.  
Daly et al. (1998) analyze American and German data over the 1970s and 1980s 
in an attempt to compare structural differences between countries regarding labour 
markets and the educational mis-match. They find that workers who have more 
schooling than typical for their job are rewarded, and those who have insufficient 
schooling are penalized with regards to earnings. Despite the fact that Germany has a 
much more structured educational system and labour market than the United States, the 
data show more similarities across countries than over time. 
Kiker et al. (1997) use the mode of the years of education as a reference for the 
required or ‘typical’ level of education of workers in Portugal. Chiswick and Miller 
(2008) use the U.S. 2000 Census and the mode of years of education to analyze the 
extent of matching educational attainment among native and foreign-born workers of 
working age. They find that migrants who have entered the labour market recently tend 
to be overeducated, while immigrants who have stayed longer in the country are more 
likely to be under-educated.  
Lindley & Lenton (2009) use UK Quarterly Labour Force Survey 1993–2003 to 
explore the incidence of over- and under-education and among natives and immigrants 
with UK degrees, and the impact of the educational mis-match on earnings. The authors 
find that compared to Whites, Black African, Other Non-White, and Indian men are 
more likely to be over-educated, whilst for women it is Indians and 
Pakistani/Bangladeshi's who are more likely to be over-educated.  
The mode of years of schooling, which I use in this paper, is a different measure 
of the ‘typical’ education which does not suffer from some of the drawbacks in using 
the mean value (for example the frequency of the actual years of education required to 
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 perform a certain job might substantially differ from the occupational mean). However, 
as a robustness check of defining the ‘typical’ education I use also the mean and the 
standard deviation of the actual years of schooling and compare the results to those 
when the mode of schooling has been used.  
While exploring the differences in returns to education among workers has 
initially driven research forward, concentrating on possible educational differences and 
their impact on earnings between natives and immigrants makes an additional 
contribution to the existing literature, given the recent and future EU expansion and the 
recent large migration flows towards the developed Western labour markets.  
 
2.3 Data Description and Empirical Strategy 
 
In this paper, I consider three European countries – France, Germany and Austria and 
compare a standard Mincerian specification using actual years of education to a 
Realized-Matches Approach specification, where the ‘typical’ education is defined by 
the mode of the education of workers in each occupation. The analysis is based on 
Luxembourg Income Study (LIS)30 data and covers France (2000); Germany (2000); 
and Austria (2000). The LIS is a micro-database compiled from labour force surveys 
from different countries. It provides demographic background information, work status 
and employment characteristics, at both the household and individual level. At the 
individual level, the LIS includes such demographic variables as age, marital status, the 
highest degree of education attained, ethnicity, migration status, and labour force status. 
The advantage of the LIS data is that they are comparable across countries because the 
original data files are transformed into a harmonized LIS data format.  
The aim of this paper is to compare the value of immigrant education systems 
(years of schooling) to the host country with respect to earnings across different 
economies. Since the seminal work of Becker (1964), economists view the choice of 
education in the context of a utility maximizing individual, who invests in education as 
long as the present value of the costs of investment equals the present value of the 
returns to this investment. The Mincerian wage equation (Mincer, 1974), which has 
                                                 
30 www.lisproject.org 
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 been applied extensively in a multitude of studies, allows for a straightforward cross-
country comparison in calculating the return to education.  
I analyze employed male31 individuals of working age. The main specification 
employed in the analysis is as follows: 
Y = f (Education, Experience, Control Variables) 
 
The monthly average earnings of the workers are expressed as a function of 
workers’ education, experience, and different control variables, which characterize the 
workers and have a potential impact on their wages. In an attempt to take account of a 
potential mis-match on education in the labour market for each country, I estimate both 
Mincerian and Realized-Matches Approach specifications:  
 
1 (Mincerian) ln Yi = β0 + β1 Educationi + β2Expi + β3Expi2 + β4Marriedi + …+ ui, and 
 
2 (Realized-matches)  ln Yi = β0 + β1 Typical Educationij + β2 Over-Educationi + β3 
Under- Educationi + β4Expi + β5 Expi2 + β6Marriedi + …+ ui, 
 
where ln Yi is the natural logarithm of the monthly earnings per worker; Education32 is 
the actual worker’s years of schooling33; ‘Typical’ Education is the mode value of 
workers’ years of schooling prevailing in the occupation34; Over-Education35 equals the 
years of schooling above the ‘typical’ education and Under-Education are the years of 
schooling below the ‘typical’ education;  i=worker and j=occupation. 
                                                 
31 The analyses is restricted to male individuals only so that it can be compared to the existing UK and US 
studies which are based on male workers only. Female earnings are known to be lower than males’ 
earnings and therefore important to be considered separate. Furthermore, the large majority of immigrants 
are male and restricting the sample to females only does not yield meaningful results due to the low 
number of observations. 
32 There is no perfect measure of education, and formal years of schooling are often used to approximate a 
given ‘skill set’ acquired by the individual. Therefore, the education variable is subject to a measurement 
error and is to be treated with caution. 
33 The years of schooling have been imputed from the highest completed level of general education. For 
further details see Robustness Checks in section IV Mincerian vs. the Realized-Matches Approach.  
34 The occupational variable across all countries is at a two-digit level based on the 4-digit ISCO-88 
standard classification. Originally, Germany had 4-digit occupational information, which had to be 
aggregated to a two-digit level so that it would be comparable to the occupational information available in 
France and Austria. 
35 Both over- and under- education are not exogenous variables; they approximate unobserved ability 
such as language skills. These variables are subject to a higher measurement error than the ‘typical’ 
education variable due to the fact that individuals in these categories exhibit a-typical levels of education. 
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 The main difference between the two specifications is the education variable. In 
the standard Mincerian equation, earnings and education are correlated in a log-linear 
fashion.36 The Realized-Matches Approach allows, however, for a more flexible 
approach, whereby returns (earnings) to education vary depending on whether the 
individual has a ‘typical’ education, over-education, or under-education. Therefore, 
each worker would be either over-educated, under-educated, or have adequate education 
(correctly-matched) similar to the usual years of education prevailing among the 
workers in his current occupation, which means that for every employee, either over-
education or under-education or both must be zero. 
Alongside the education variables, both specifications allow for a range of 
control variables to explain the outcome: potential labour experience (approximated by 
the standard formula of ([Age - Years of Schooling – 6]); a dummy variable for marital 
status; a geographical dummy for different regions; a company ownership dummy 
indicating whether the worker is employed in a state or private enterprise; and a sectoral 
dummy indicating whether the sector of employment is industry, services, or 
agriculture.37 Two additional control variables in each specification indicate whether the 
worker has a permanent fixed-term contract of employment, and whether he has a 
supervisory role which involves managing other co-workers or not. 
Table 1 presents the incidence of educational mis-match among employed 
workers aged 16-60/64, according to the criteria of the Realized-Matches Approach, i.e. 
how many of them are correctly educated (have the ‘typical’ education), over-educated 
or under-educated. When the actual years of education of a worker are higher than the 
mode of years of schooling among workers in a certain occupation, he is considered to 
be over-educated, and when his years of education are lower than the same mode, he is 
under-educated. Equality between the education of an employee and the modal years of 
schooling across different occupations qualify him to be correctly educated (matched), 
which means that he has the usual years of education typical for his occupation.  
                                                 
36 Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3 present the different educational levels in Austria, France, and Germany and 
their corresponding years of schooling. 
37 One disadvantage of the data is that there is no information on years since migration for the foreign-
born workers though in Chiswick and Miller (2005), this variable has a minor impact on earnings. 
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 The average years of schooling38 across native and foreign-born39 workers in 
each country are presented in the first column of Table 1. In Austria the average years 
of schooling are 12 independently from the worker’s country of birth. The foreign-born 
workers in both France and Germany have on average 9 years of schooling, while the 
French native workers have studied on average for 11 years as opposed to 10 years in 
the case of German native workers. This could also be illustrated by distributional charts 
(Chart 1, Chart 2, and Chart 3) of actual years of schooling for each of the three 
countries of analysis. More than 60 percent of all workers in Austria have 12 years of 
schooling, which is equivalent to having a high school diploma. In France and 
Germany, the dispersion is higher given that in France 25 percent of the workers have 
11 years of schooling (graduated secondary school), and 45 percent of workers have 9 
years of schooling (general high school education) in Germany.  
Taking into account the modal value of the actual years of schooling for each 
worker’s occupation, Austria has the highest proportions of correctly matched native 
and foreign-born workers across all countries of analysis: 73 percent correctly matched 
native workers and 62 percent correctly matched immigrants. In Germany, there are an 
almost equal proportion of correctly matched natives (50 percent) and correctly matched 
immigrants (46 percent), whereas in France, 37 percent of native workers are correctly 
matched as opposed to 27 percent for the foreign-born workers.  
The incidence of over-education is quite significant and equally distributed 
among native and immigrant workers in Germany (35 percent), while in France, 
workers are less frequently over-educated (26 percent of native and 21 percent of 
foreign-born workers). The lowest levels of over-education among workers are in 
Austria, where only 5 percent of native workers are over-educated compared to 11 
percent of foreign-born workers. The incidence of under-education is highest in France, 
where almost 52 percent of foreign-born workers are under-educated as opposed to 38 
percent across native workers. 
A further indication of a potential mis-match is provided by the ratio of over-
educated workers in low-skilled occupations or under-educated workers in highly 
                                                 
38 The average years of schooling have been calculated as the average of the modes across all occupations 
in a country. 
39 Foreign-born workers are defined as all workers born outside the country of analysis. The terms 
foreign-born workers and immigrant workers are used interchangeably throughout the paper.   
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 skilled occupations40. In Germany, the proportions of over-educated native and foreign-
born workers in low-skilled occupations are similar at 36 percent, while in France there 
are more over-educated native workers in low-skilled occupations (25 percent) 
compared to foreign-born workers (20 percent). Under-educated foreign-born workers 
in high-skilled occupations are in higher proportion than their native counterparts across 
all three countries of analysis. The highest proportion of foreign-born under-educated 
workers in highly skilled occupations is in France where 44 percent of foreign-born 
workers have the above characteristic.  
More than 50 percent of all native and foreign-born workers are married where 
the presence of a spouse is higher across foreign-born workers in all three countries. 
Similarly, more than half of all workers in France, Germany, and Austria are employed 
on a permanent contract basis, and a substantial percentage of native and foreign-born 
workers in France (60 percent) and Austria (50 percent) have a supervisory position. 
Table 2a presents a comparison of the differences between native and immigrant 
workers’ educational mis-matches across countries. The data from Austria, France, and 
Germany are contrasted to the UK (1993-2003) and the USA (2000) data presented by 
Lindley and Linton (2006) and Chiswick and Miller (2005) respectively.41 In all 
countries, the percentage of correctly matched native workers is higher than that for 
immigrant workers, but the gaps in the UK and the USA are larger than in their 
continental European counterparts. In France, Germany, and the USA, over-educated 
immigrant workers are less frequently over-educated than their native co-workers that 
share similar characteristics. The UK and Austria are the two countries where over-
educated foreign-born employees are more frequent than over-educated native workers. 
In all countries of analysis, immigrants are more frequently under-educated than natives 
with the exception of the UK. The gap between under-educated foreign-born and native 
workers is highest in the USA (18 percentage points), followed by France, where the 
corresponding gap is 14 percentage points. 
If the distribution of correctly matched-, over- and under-educated is normalised 
by the native-foreign-born distributions, a clearer picture emerges in Table 2b. In this 
                                                 
40 Highly skilled occupations are defined here as those occupations where the majority of workers have a 
post-secondary education (more than a high-school diploma), or highly educated workers have a 10% 
wage premium with respect to less educated workers. For details see Gottschalk and Hansen (2003). 
41 The UK data focuses only on white male natives versus white male immigrants, while the data for the 
U.S. is restricted only to males. 
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 table, any ratio above 1 indicates that the proportion of natives in realised-matches (or 
over-/under-education) is higher than the proportion of natives in the entire sample, i.e. 
natives are over-represented. Conversely, a ratio below one indicates that natives are 
under-represented (or foreign-born workers are over-represented). In all three countries, 
native workers are substantially over-represented in jobs with a correct match of 
education. In France and Germany, there are proportionally more native over-educated 
workers, and in all three countries, foreign-born workers are proportionately more 
under-educated. Similarly to incidences for the US and the UK, these statistics suggest 
that there is a structural difference between native and foreign-born workers.  
 
2.4 Mincerian vs. the Realized-Matches Approach 
 
Tables 3, 4, and 5 present the regression estimates of the standard Mincerian Approach 
as opposed to the Realized-Matches Approach for natives and the foreign-born in 
France, Germany, and Austria for the year 2000.  The first two columns in each table 
refer to native workers, while the last two columns pertain to foreign-born workers.  
 
Natives 
The Mincerian specification for natives across the three countries of analysis 
confirms the positive and significant relationship between actual years of schooling and 
earnings. Each additional year of schooling accounts for a 6.2 percent increase in the 
earnings of a native French worker; 6.5 percent for every German worker; and 7.8 
percent in the case of a native Austrian employee.   
The partial effect of labour experience on earnings varies with years of 
experience and is given by accounting for both coefficients for experience and 
experience2/100 and taking the first derivative with respect to experience. Thus, the fifth 
year of potential employment experience after finishing formal education for a French 
native worker, for example, yields a 2.7 percent increase in his earnings; 4 percent 
increase in the earnings of a German employee; and a 1.5 percent increase for a native 
Austrian worker.  
Amongst many control variables (region, industry, type of contract) present in 
the Mincerian specification for native workers, three variables are of interest and have a 
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 significant impact on earnings. Employment on a permanent contract basis benefits the 
earnings of native workers across all three countries in the range of 30-35 percent on 
average. Work-positions which have a supervisory role and involve managing people 
are also a significant driver of wage earnings and contribute by an average of 20 percent 
to higher wages across France and Austria, and a 35 percent increase in earnings in the 
case of Germany.42 The ownership of the worker’s company, i.e. whether the company 
is private or state-owned is a significant variable and somewhat surprisingly suggests 
that working for a private company will have a 10-15 percent negative impact on the 
earnings of workers across France, Germany, and Austria. 
Once we use the Realized-Matches Approach and account for the prevalent 
years of education across the workers of a certain occupation, the impact of the ‘typical’ 
education on earnings among native workers in all countries of analysis is higher than 
that for the actual years of education. These results are in full accordance with other 
studies on the American and Canadian economies (Chiswick and Miller, 2009 and 
Vahey, 2000). The returns to ‘typical’ education range from 8 per cent to 8.8 per cent, 
some 2 percentage points higher than that for the actual years of education in the case of 
native workers in France and Germany and 1 percentage point in Austria. A year of 
over-education among native workers contributes to a 6.8 percent increase in earnings 
for the French worker, 3.6 percent for the German worker, and 7.7 percent for the 
Austrian worker, which is substantially less than the return to ‘typical’ education. In 
contrast, a year of education less than the usual years of education among workers in a 
certain occupation has a negative impact on native workers’ earnings as follows:  -4.2 
percent in France, -6.7 percent in Germany, and -7 percent in Austria. 
 
Foreign-born 
Employing both Mincerian and the Realized-Matches Approach analysis for 
foreign-born workers (the last two columns of tables 3, 4, and 5) shows similar 
dynamics in the earnings function for foreign-born workers across the countries of 
analysis. The actual years of education have a 5 percent positive impact on earnings of 
foreign-born workers in France; 3 percent for immigrants in Germany; and 4 percent for 
                                                 
42 Note that this is equivalent to the average wage premium for supervisory positions, but the data do not 
allow for a more granular distinction between the various supervisory or management positions. 
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 those in Austria. In contrast, once the Realized-Matches Approach is used and the usual 
years of education prevailing among the workers across occupations are taken into 
account, the impact of the ‘typical’ education on earnings increases to 7 percent in 
France; 9 percent in Germany; and exceeds 10 percent in Austria43. Given that this 
tendency is observed among both native and foreign-born workers across all three 
countries suggests that earnings are explained better by the usual years of education 
typical in a given occupation, rather than by the actual years of schooling pertaining to 
each individual worker. Thus for a given occupation the individual’s level of education 
in relation to the prevailing ‘typical’ level of education in that occupation is the most 
relevant driver of earnings. The best returns are for the education years precisely up to 
the ‘typical’ level, with a smaller premium for each additional year of over-education. 
The occupation and the prevailing level of education amongst workers in this 
occupation are more important in defining one’s earnings than his diploma and actual 
years of study. However, the actual years of study partly influence the choice of 
occupation and successful employment. 
The positive impact of over-education on earnings varies between 1 percent for 
Germany and 4 percent for France, while under-education penalizes foreign-born 
workers by 3.6 percent of their earnings in France; 5 percent in Germany; and 4 percent 
in Austria. All other explanatory variables in the Realized-Matches Approach for 
foreign-born workers share a similar magnitude to their equivalents in the Mincerian 
specification.  
 
Foreign-born vs. Natives  
The standard Mincerian specification in tables 3, 4, and 5 allows for the 
comparison of actual years of education and their impact on earnings between native 
and foreign-born workers. The native-immigrant gap in returns to actual years of 
education is 3 percentage points in favour of native workers in Germany and Austria, 
and 1 percentage point in France.  
Table 6 provides the Realized-Matches Approach education estimates on 
earnings and allows for a comparison between native and foreign-born workers across 
                                                 
43 The slope coefficients of actual years of education and those for ‘typical education’ are significantly 
different across all countries of analysis (France p=0.03, Germany p=0.05, and Austria p=0.06). 
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 countries. The native-immigrant gap in ‘typical education’ in France and Germany is 1 
percentage point, 2 percentage points in Austria, 1.5 percentage points in the UK 
(Lindley & Linton, 2006), and does not exist in the USA (Chiswick and Miller, 2007). 
When accounting for the usual years of schooling across occupations, the gap of the 
‘typical’ education estimates between the correctly matched native and foreign-born 
workers across all countries is not statistically significant. This finding suggests that if a 
migrant succeeds in finding a job requiring his actual years of schooling, then the 
impact of her education on earnings is similar to that of a native worker independent of 
how strict the immigration policy is in the country. 
The years of education above the usual years of education of workers across 
occupations have a greater positive impact on the earnings of natives than on the wages 
of foreign-born workers. The gap of over-education estimates between native and 
foreign-born workers is significant in France and Germany at around 2.5 percentage 
points in favour of native workers. An additional year of over-education among native 
workers in the UK and the USA has on average, a greater impact on earnings than that 
for foreign-born workers with a gap in over-education estimates of 1.5 percentage 
points for the UK and 1.1 percentage points in the United States. The same tendency is 
valid for Austria, where the native-immigrant over-education gap is 5 percentage points 
but, however, is not significant. Over-educated native workers in the EU countries 
(France, Germany, and Austria) with stricter immigration policies are rewarded 
significantly more than foreign-born workers in comparison to the more liberal US and 
the UK. 
When the education of a worker is less than the usual level of years of education 
of his occupational colleagues, this under-education has a negative impact on earnings. 
Foreign-born workers, however, are penalized less44 than their native co-workers across 
all countries of analysis with the exception of the UK45. The native-immigrant under-
education gap is the highest in the USA and is 4.4 percentage points in favour of 
foreign-born workers, followed by Austria with 3.1 percentage points, 1.6 percentage 
points in Germany, and almost 1 percentage point in France and the UK. The less 
conservative immigration policy in the US, results in penalizing under-educated 
migrants less than their native counterparts. 
                                                 
44 Note that the migrant population may be subject to a selection bias. 
45 The native-immigrant gap in under-education is not significant for the UK. 
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 Tables 3, 4, and 5 provide further information when comparing the rest of the 
control variables in the Realized-Matches Approach specification between native and 
foreign-born workers. The experience of foreign-born workers has a smaller impact on 
their earnings, in comparison to native workers, but has however a positive and 
significant impact on earnings across all three countries. Workers with permanent 
contracts or taking supervisory positions are likely to have similar higher earnings than 
those who have fixed-term contracts, and do not supervise other workers regardless of 
whether they are native or foreign-born workers across all the countries of analysis. 
Combining the results from table 6 together with table 2b provide some 
interesting insights into the native-migrant gaps in educational impact on earnings 
across countries. On the one hand, table 6 shows that the relatively liberal with regards 
to immigration policy46, UK and US economies value the over-education of migrants 
and natives equally (the over-education gap being approximately zero), while France, 
Germany, and Austria, countries that pursue a more conservative immigration policy, 
reward over-educated natives more than over-educated migrants. On the other hand, 
table 2b shows that the efficiency of the labour markets in the UK and the US is lower 
than that in the other three countries with respect to typical education and over-
education in the case of the UK. In the case of Austria, the incidence of the over-
education of migrants is higher than that for natives with respect to the corresponding 
total numbers of natives and migrants due to the relatively small number of over-
educated migrants and the overall low variability in years of education for both natives 
and migrants, which requires additional caution when interpreting the regression 
results.47 
The combination of the selection on quality (high-education, high skills) through 
immigration policy and of the matching efficiency of the labour markets (see Table 2b) 
could potentially explain the fact that the UK and the US attract some of the best 
educated and highly skilled immigrants despite the flaws in the matching mechanism in 
their labour markets.  
 
                                                 
46 Liberal immigration policy refers to easier access to the labour market for immigrants as opposed to a 
conservative immigration policy referring to a more difficult access to the labour market in the host 
country. 
47 Please note that the immigrants’ sample for Austria is substantially smaller than for the other countries 
of analysis. 
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 Robustness checks 
One drawback of the data is that the years of schooling have been imputed from 
the highest completed level of education for each individual, an approach known for 
having a downward bias on the returns to schooling.48 The imputation was rather 
straightforward given that the highest completed degree by each individual corresponds 
to certain years of education typical for the educational system in each country. Despite 
the differences in educational systems across Austria, France, and Germany, in all 
countries the high-school diploma corresponds to 12 years of education on average, 
while a university degree corresponds to 18 years of education.  A further concern with 
regards to imputing the years or schooling from the highest completed level of 
education is the degrees in different countries could have a different meaning, which 
makes the comparison between them a challenging task. For example, the fact that most 
of the foreign-born workers in France come from North Africa (Morocco, Algeria, and 
Tunisia) is not that alarming given that all these countries were French colonies in the 
past, and their educational systems are based on the French educational system, which 
facilitates the comparison between the educational degrees of their workers. While the 
years of schooling required for getting a degree might not be that different between 
countries, the quality of education and the educational institutions across countries do 
differ and make employers more sceptical of the skills and experience based on degrees 
held by foreign-born workers compared to natives. To tackle this issue, I conducted 
robustness checks of the returns to education of immigrants coming from a certain 
geographic area (e.g. Eastern Europe, Northern Africa). The coefficients are very 
similar and not significantly different from the ones received when all immigrants were 
considered as one group, which might suggest that the extent of imputation bias 
between these two regions is similar or the differences in the human-capital context in 
these areas work in opposite directions. 
A potential concern is that the immigrant variable does not make a distinction 
between EU and non-EU immigrants. Workers from EU-member countries can move 
freely within the European Union as a matter of right, while non-EU members will be at 
least partially selected by the receiving country (visa, working permits, etc.) In the case 
of Austria and Germany, once the EU/non-EU split is made, the size of the immigrant 
                                                 
48 See Munich, Svejnar and Terrell (2005) 
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 sample is too small for any meaningful analysis to be made. However, in France there 
are 504 migrants born in other EU counties, and 1100 non-EU migrants. The regression 
analysis shows that there is no significant difference in the educational coefficients 
between the EU migrants and the non-EU migrants49 both for the Mincerian and the 
Realised-Matches Approach. 
The information on occupations varies across countries. In Germany the 
occupational variable is based on a 4-digit ISCO-88 standard classification. This 
variable had to be aggregated to a two-digit level, so that it is fully comparable with the 
other two countries of analysis: France and Austria. As a sensitivity-check of the 
German occupational data, different regressions were run, where the occupational 
variable was at three digit-level and the resulting coefficients were not significantly 
different from those acquired when using occupations at a two-digit level. 
In this paper all estimations are based on defining the ‘typical’ education as the 
mode of the actual years of schooling prevailing across occupations. Considering the 
caveats related to the measurement of education, robustness checks were employed to 
test the sensitivity of the results to the definition of the ‘typical’ education. Defining the 
‘typical’ education as either one year less or more than the data derived, the mode of 
education in each occupation yields very similar results. Thus under these sensitivity 
scenarios50 the coefficient estimates are slightly different compared with the standard 
estimation in all three country datasets, which translates into negligible differences in 
terms of the effects of education on earnings. Furthermore, I use also the mean and a 
range of one standard deviation of the actual years of schooling when defining the 
‘typical’ education, and compare the results to those when the mode of schooling has 
been used. There are no significant differences in the impact of education on earnings 
when the mean of actual years of schooling is used as a benchmark for ‘typical’ 
education.51 
 
High-skilled vs. Low-skilled occupations 
                                                 
49 Results are available upon request. 
50 Given the potential correlation between the education variable and other regressors such as permanent 
contract or supervisory position dummies, both Mincerian and Realised-Matches regressions were run 
omitting those variables. The coefficients for education are not significantly different from those when 
these regressors are included. Results are available upon request. 
51 Results are available upon request. 
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 In recent decades, the labour markets in the developed economies have been 
characterised by a constantly growing demand for ‘college’-educated or highly skilled 
workers due to the increasing importance of the strong skill-biased technological change 
experienced by these economies. Therefore, the distinction between high-skilled 
occupations (those that demand predominantly highly skilled or college workers) on the 
one hand and low-skilled occupations (those that demand predominantly low-skilled or 
non-college workers) on the other and how they differ with regards to educational 
returns is important in analysing the native-migrant educational impact on earnings. 
There are multiple definitions of ’college’ and ‘non-college’ occupations, which 
in essence focus on explaining the concept of over-education (see McGuiness 2006 for a 
review) but the Gottschalk and Hansen (2003) approach provides the most useful insight 
into the educational impact on earnings of natives as opposed to immigrants since it is 
based solely on economic outcomes. Gottschalk and Hansen (2003) define 
automatically college and non-college occupations when one type of worker (highly-
educated or a college worker with more than a high-school diploma or a less-educated 
or non-college worker with a high-school diploma) is strongly prevailing. The authors 
define college (high-skilled) occupations as those occupations where more than 90% of 
the workers have higher or college education, and non-college (low-skilled) occupations 
as those occupations where more than 90% of the workers have a lower or non-college 
education. For those occupations where there is no clear majority of workers with 
college or non-college education, a 10% college wage premium threshold applies, i.e. an 
occupation is classified as a college (high-skilled) occupation when it pays at least a 
10% premium to highly educated (college) workers. In this paper, I use the same 
thresholds as those used by Gottschalk and Hansen (2003). Table 7 shows the regression 
estimates of returns to education based on the Mincerian and Realized-Matches 
specifications for France and Germany.  
Focusing on the Realized-Matches specification and comparing Table 6 to Table 
7, the estimates for the correctly matched, over-educated and under-educated natives 
working in high-skilled occupations in Table 7 are similar to their equivalents in Table 6 
in both France and Germany. However, comparing the regression estimates for French 
migrants shows that if a migrant manages to get a job in a high-skilled occupation that 
accurately reflects her educational skills, she will be rewarded substantially more than 
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 otherwise (12 percent as opposed to 7.1 percent). While for Germany, the evidence of 
the above tendency is not that strong; the penalty for under-educated migrants working 
in high-skilled occupations (-15.6 percent) is significantly larger than that of the pooled 
occupational sample (-3.6 percent).  
Focusing on low-skilled occupations, the penalty for natives being under-
educated in Germany (-11.8 percent) is substantially higher than its equivalent in Table 
6 (-6.7 percent). In France, the returns to education of correctly matched natives and 
immigrants working in low-skilled occupations are substantially lower than those of the 
pooled occupational sample. Comparing further the estimates between the correctly 
matched French native and immigrant workers in low-skilled occupations in Table 6 
shows that French migrants have a significantly lower returns to education compared to 
natives (3.8 percent as opposed to 6.3 percent) in the case where their education 
matches the one prevailing in a certain low-skilled occupation. 
Overall, contrasting the regression results obtained using the Mincerian and 
Realized-Matches Approach regarding the educational attainment of native and foreign-
born workers in Austria, Germany, and France, highlights the importance of accounting 
for potential mis-matches due to the over- or under-education of workers. Using the 
Realized-Matches Approach and accounting for the usual years of schooling across 
different occupations rather than just actual years of schooling, better explains the 
variation in earnings and allows for a more nuanced explanation of why foreign-born 
workers have lower rates of return to education than natives. While returns to ‘typical’ 
education are similar between native and immigrant workers, over-educated immigrants 
have significantly lower returns to education compared to natives. There is some weak 
evidence that foreign-born workers are penalized less for being under-educated than 
natives. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
This paper attempts to explain the relationship between education and wages among 
native and foreign-born workers in Austria, France, and Germany. While a standard 
Mincerian specification suggests a significant gap in returns to education between 
natives and workers, this study investigates to what extent these differences result from 
a potential mis-match between the actual and the ‘typical’ years of schooling typical for 
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 a certain occupation. The results of the Realised-Matches Approach provide an 
explanation, suggesting a more nuanced picture: returns to the ‘typical’ education are 
very similar for natives and the foreign-born, while natives are over-compensated 
compared to foreign-born workers for each over-educated worker. Natives tend to be 
over-represented among over-educated workers (e.g. in France and Germany), which 
explains why in the standard Mincerian specification natives appear to have higher 
returns to education. There is limited evidence that foreign-born workers are less 
penalised for being under-educated compared to native workers although a significant 
difference is only observed in Austria.  
Due to data limitations and methodology changes of variable definitions across 
and within countries, it was not possible to carry out a regression analysis over time and 
therefore verify or disprove the Search and Match theory or the Human Capital theory, 
which both require a time dimension in the data. However, the regression analysis 
confirms the Assignment theory hypothesis of under-educated workers being penalized 
more than the rewarded, over-educated workers in Germany and Austria. The 
Technological Change theory is confirmed in the analysis for France where the 
incidence of over-educated migrants from non-EU countries is triple the one for over-
educated migrants from EU countries. 
The main conclusions can be summarised as follows: Foreign-born workers find 
it slightly more difficult to find employment in occupations matching their level of 
education. When they do find employment in such occupations, their earnings are on 
par with those of natives of similar educational attainment. However, compared to 
natives, foreign-born workers have lower returns to over-education, which drives the 
gap in earnings between natives and the foreign-born. This is evidence for the difference 
in the ‘quality’ of education among natives and foreign-born employees. That is 
foreign-born workers both find it more difficult to find jobs matching their education 
and may also face lower earnings than natives for similar levels of education beyond the 
prevailing level in a given occupation. 
When distinguishing between highly skilled and low-skilled occupations, France 
rewards over-educated and correctly educated migrants in highly skilled occupations 
substantially more than natives. While the same is valid for Germany in the case of the 
‘typical’ education of migrants across highly skilled occupations, the penalty for being 
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 an under-educated migrant working in a highly skilled occupation is significantly higher 
than that for natives.  
Focusing on low-skilled occupations, it is worth noting that in France the returns 
to education for correctly matched natives and immigrants are substantially lower than 
those for the pooled occupational sample. Furthermore, French migrants in low-skilled 
occupations have significantly lower returns to education compared to natives in the 
case where their education matches the one prevailing in a certain low-skilled 
occupation. 
Differences in immigration policies (access to labour markets) do not play a role 
while comparing the educational returns of native and migrant workers who have found 
a position perfectly corresponding to their education. The gap between educational 
returns of natives and workers across all countries in this case is non-existent. However, 
migrant-conservative labour markets in the EU countries of France, Germany, and 
Austria reward native workers more than they reward immigrants in the case these 
workers have higher education than that ’typical’ for their occupation. In contrast, the 
more migrant-friendly labour markets in the UK and the US do not distinguish between 
natives and immigrants in rewarding over-education. The fact that the UK and the US 
pursue relatively liberal immigrant labour market policies and do not punish migrants 
for being over-educated, compared to the rest of the EU, could potentially explain the 
fact that the UK and the US attract some of the best educated and highly skilled 
immigrants despite the uncertainties of the matching mechanism in their respective 
labour markets.  
The findings of this paper are generally in accordance with previous studies for 
the US and the UK, which also find little difference in remuneration for correctly 
matched native and foreign-born employees coupled with an over-representation of 
native workers in correctly matched positions and for those over-educated in their 
positions. Furthermore, in the absence of mis-matches across occupations (over- and 
under-education), the returns to ‘typical’ education using the Realized-Matches 
Approach for both groups of employees are substantially higher than their returns to 
education in the Mincerian Framework in all countries.  
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 2.A Appendix 
 
A.1. Highest Educational Degree Achieved by Workers and Years of Schooling 
(Austria, 2000) 
Highest Educational Degree Years of Schooling 
Less than 1st stage of secondary level 5
1st stage of secondary level 8
2nd stage of secondary level 12
3rd level other than university degree 13
Initial university degree or equivalent 16
Higher university degree or post-doctorate 18
Source: Luxembourg Income Study 
The education variable in the Luxembourg Income Study is constructed according to the ISCED 97 
international standard classification of education; calculations are done by the author. 
 
 
 
A.2. Highest Educational Degree Achieved by Workers and Years of Schooling 
(France, 2000) 
Highest Educational Degree Years of Schooling 
BEPC, Brevet des Colleges 9
Degree lycee 11
A-E baccalaureat 12
Baccalaureat Professionel 13
CAP, BEP 11
Technical 12
1st cycle 14
2nd cycle 16
3rd cycle 18
Source: Luxembourg Income Study, calculations are done by the author. 
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A.3. Highest Educational Degree Achieved by Workers and Years of Schooling 
(Germany, 2000) 
Highest Educational Degree Years of Schooling 
   
Secondary education (Hauptschule) 9  
Secondary education, 1st stage 
(Realschule) 10  
Secondary education, 2nd stage (Abitur) 13  
Academy (Fachoberschule) 12  
Technical college (Fachhochschule) 13  
University 18  
Foreign university 18  
Technical school (GDR) 13  
University GDR 18  
Other diploma 12   
 
                Source: Luxembourg Income Study, calculations are done by the author. 
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   Table 1. Distribution of Key Statistics by Country and Status (%) 
  
 
 
Average 
years of 
education 
Correctly 
educated 
Over-
educated 
Under-
educated 
Over-
educ. in 
a low-
skilled 
occ. 
Under-
educ. in 
a highly 
skilled 
occ. 
 
 
 
Married 
 
 
 
 
Permanent 
Employee 
 
 
 
Supervisor 
 
 
     
   
Austria          
Natives 12 73.33 4.86 21.82 3 7 60.1 50.7 64.9 
Foreign-
born 
 
12 61.54 10.99 27.47 9 22 
 
74.0 
 
43.6 
 
61.2 
          
France          
Natives 11 36.92 25.58 37.49 25 38 56.8 54.2 48.7 
Foreign-
born 
 
9 27.22 21.27 51.5 20 44 
 
71.2 
 
50.8 
 
50.1 
          
Germany          
Natives 10 50.11 36.24 13.65 36 23 60.6 50.4 14.1 
Foreign-
born 
 
9 45.54 35.78 18.67 36 29 
 
76.8 
 
48.2 
 
8.1 
 Chart 1. Distribution of Years of Schooling, Austria (2000) 
 
 
Chart 2. Distribution of Years of Schooling, France (2000) 
 
 
Chart 3. Distribution of Years of Schooling, Germany (2000) 
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Table 2a. Difference between Native and Foreign-Born Workers’ Education across 
Countries (percentage points) 
 
  
Correctly 
educated 
Over-
educated
Under-
educated
    
Austria 11.79 -6.13 -5.65 
    
France 9.70 4.31 -14.01 
    
Germany 4.57 0.46 -5.02 
    
UK* 15.00 -19.00 3.00 
    
USA** 14.60 3.99 -18.65 
                             
                                             * Lindley & Linton (2006) Estimates for white male natives vs. white male immigrants  
                                                between 1993-2003. 
                                           ** Chiswick & Miller (2007) estimates are for males only based on the 2000 Census data. 
 
 
 
Table 2b. Ratio of Native to Foreign-Born across Realised Matches and Countries 
(%) 
 
 
‘Typical’ 
education 
Over-
education
Under-
education
Over-
educated in a 
low-skilled 
occup. 
Under-
educated in a 
highly skilled 
occup. 
      
France 1.32 1.19 0.73 1.25 0.86 
Germany 1.07 1.09 0.66 1 0.79 
Austria 1.19 0.44 0.79 0.33 0.32 
UK* 1.71 0.66 1.13 n/a n/a 
US^ 1.53 1.14 0.58 n/a n/a 
Source: LIS Project and the author's calculation.   
* White males only, based on Lindley & Linton (2006).   
^ Males only, based on Chiswick & Miller (2007).   
 Table 3. OLS Estimates of Earnings: Mincer vs. the Realized Matches Approach 
France, (2000) 
 Natives                           Foreign-born 
 
Mincerian Realized Match Mincerian 
Realized 
Match 
Education  0.062
*** 
     (0.001) (b) 
0.051*** 
(0.005) (b) 
‘Typical’ Education(a) (b) 
0.080*** 
(0.002) (b) 
0.071*** 
(0.006) 
Over-education (b) 0.068
*** 
(0.004) (b) 
0.042*** 
(0.011) 
Under-education (b) -0.042
*** 
(0.002) (b) 
-0.036*** 
(0.006) 
Experience 0.031
*** 
     (0.001) 
0.032*** 
(0.002) 
0.026*** 
(0.006) 
0.023*** 
(0.005) 
Experience2/100 -0.038
*** 
     (0.004) 
-0.044*** 
(0.004) 
-0.025*** 
 (0.010) 
-0.023*** 
 (0.009) 
Married dummy        0.006       (0.011) 
0.001 
     (0.011) 
-0.009 
(0.041) 
0.006 
(0.040) 
Private/State Dummy -0.101
*** 
(0.011) 
-0.074*** 
(0.011) 
-0.120*** 
(0.049) 
-0.065 
(0.052) 
Permanent contract 
dummy 
0.352*** 
(0.018) 
0.327*** 
(0.018) 
0.288*** 
(0.051) 
0.262*** 
(0.050) 
Supervisory role 
dummy 
0.238*** 
(0.013) 
0.212*** 
(0.012) 
0.337*** 
(0.043) 
0.304*** 
(0.043) 
Controls yes yes yes yes 
Constant 7.528
*** 
(0.045) 
7.291*** 
(0.049) 
7.571*** 
(0.141) 
7.333*** 
(0.146) 
R2 0.42 0.44 0.38 0.40 
Number of 
Observations 9143 9143 921 921 
Notes: (a) Computed by using the modal value of years of schooling across occupations 
            (b) Variable not included 
 Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses.  
*** denotes significance at the 1 percent significance level; ** denotes significance at the 5 percent 
significance level; * denotes significance at the 10 percent significance level. 
Married dummy – reference group is not married, divorced or widowed 
Private/State dummy – reference group is state-owned company  
Permanent contract dummy – reference group is fixed-term contract 
Supervisory role dummy – reference group is no supervisory role of the worker 
Controls – region, industry (reference groups are services and agriculture) 
Source: Luxemburg Income Study: www.lisproject.org 
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 Table 4. OLS Estimates of Earnings: Mincer vs. the Realized Matches Approach 
Germany, (2000) 
 Natives                           Foreign-born 
 
Mincerian Realized Match Mincerian 
Realized 
Match 
Education  0.065
*** 
     (0.003) (b) 
0.031*** 
(0.005) (b) 
‘Typical’ Education(a) (b) 
0.086*** 
(0.004) (b) 
0.096*** 
(0.011) 
Over-education (b) 0.036
*** 
(0.006) (b) 
0.012* 
(0.007) 
Under-education (b) -0.067
*** 
(0.009) (b) 
-0.051*** 
(0.018) 
Experience 0.049
*** 
     (0.004) 
0.049*** 
(0.004) 
0.038*** 
(0.007) 
0.039*** 
(0.007) 
Experience2/100 -0.086
*** 
      (0.007) 
-0.085*** 
(0.007) 
-0.056*** 
 (0.014) 
-0.058*** 
 (0.013) 
Married dummy        -0.030
* 
      (0.017) 
-0.032* 
     (0.018) 
-0.031 
(0.052) 
-0.020 
(0.051) 
Private/State Dummy -0.157
*** 
(0.018) 
-0.132*** 
(0.019) 
-0.117*** 
(0.047) 
-0.051 
(0.047) 
Permanent contract 
dummy 
0.352*** 
(0.024) 
0.358*** 
(0.024) 
0.346*** 
(0.051) 
0.363*** 
(0.051) 
Supervisory role 
dummy 
0.355*** 
(0.019) 
0.351*** 
(0.019) 
0.478*** 
(0.062) 
0.408*** 
(0.061) 
Controls yes yes yes yes 
Constant 5.866
*** 
(0.080) 
5.660*** 
(0.082) 
6.192*** 
(0.178) 
5.633*** 
(0.199) 
R2 0.42 0.44 0.50 0.53 
Number of 
Observations 9069 9069 1333 1333 
Notes: (a) Computed by using the modal value of years of schooling across occupations 
            (b) Variable not included 
 Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses.  
*** denotes significance at the 1 percent significance level; ** denotes significance at the 5 percent 
significance level; * denotes significance at the 10 percent significance level. 
Married dummy – reference group is not married, divorced or widowed 
Private/State dummy – reference group is state-owned company  
Permanent contract dummy – reference group is fixed-term contract 
Supervisory role dummy – reference group is no supervisory role of the worker 
Controls – region, industry (reference groups are services and agriculture) 
Source: Luxemburg Income Study: www.lisproject.org 
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Table 5. OLS Estimates of Earnings: Mincer vs. the Realized Matches Approach 
Austria, (2000) 
 Natives                           Foreign-born 
 
Mincerian Realized Match Mincerian 
Realized 
Match 
Education  0.078
*** 
      (0.006) (b) 
   0.041*** 
 (0.018) (b) 
‘Typical’ Education a (b) 
0.088*** 
(0.009) (b)
    0.107*** 
(0.028) 
Over-education (b) 0.077
*** 
      (0.010) (b)
   0.025* 
(0.023) 
Under-education (b) -0.072
*** 
(0.009) (b) 
  -0.041** 
(0.021) 
Experience 0.017
*** 
      (0.004) 
0.017*** 
(0.004) 
   0.057*** 
  (0.019) 
0.056*** 
(0.019) 
Experience2/100 -0.017
** 
      (0.009) 
-0.018** 
(0.009) 
  -0.097*** 
(0.039) 
-0.096*** 
(0.039) 
Married dummy -0.071
*** 
      (0.024) 
-0.069*** 
(0.024) 
  -0.220*** 
(0.105) 
   -0.225*** 
(0.099) 
Private/State Dummy -0.074
*** 
(0.027) 
-0.069*** 
(0.026) 
-0.244*** 
(0.111) 
-0.195* 
(0.108) 
Permanent contract 
dummy 
0.320*** 
(0.054) 
0.326*** 
(0.054) 
0.192 
(0.156) 
0.255* 
(0.162) 
Supervisory role 
dummy 
0.204*** 
(0.21) 
0.206*** 
(0.021) 
0.152 
(0.203) 
0.174* 
(0.108) 
Controls yes yes yes yes 
Constant 7.824
*** 
(0.133) 
7.691*** 
(0.162) 
8.272*** 
(0.376) 
7.463*** 
(0.511) 
R2 0.46 0.46 0.44 0.47 
Number of 
Observations 1747 1747 152 152 
Notes: (a) Computed by using the modal value of years of schooling across occupations 
            (b) Variable not included 
 Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses.  
*** denotes significance at the 1 percent significance level; ** denotes significance at the 5 percent 
significance level; * denotes significance at the 10 percent significance level. 
Married dummy – reference group is not married, divorced or widowed 
Private/State dummy – reference group is state-owned company  
Permanent contract dummy – reference group is fixed-term contract 
Supervisory role dummy – reference group is no supervisory role of the worker 
Controls – region, industry (reference groups are services and agriculture) 
Source: Luxemburg Income Study: www.lisproject.org
 Table 6. Regression Estimates of the Returns to Education on Earnings by the Realized Matches Approach across 
Countries  
  Correctly Educated Overeducated Undereducated 
Natives Immigrants
Native-
Imm. 
Gap Natives Immigrants 
Native-
Imm. 
Gap Natives Immigrants
Native-
Imm. 
Gap 
          
          
France  0.08 0.071 0.009 0.068 0.042    0.026*** -0.042 -0.036 -0.006* 
          
Germany 0.086 0.096 -0.01 0.036 0.012    0.024*** -0.067 -0.051 -0.016 
          
Austria  0.088 0.107 -0.019 0.077 0.025 0.052 -0.072 -0.041 -0.031** 
          
UK 1 0.069 0.054 0.015 0.025 0.009 0.016 -0.036 -0.044 0.008 
          
USA 2 0.153 0.153 0 0.056 0.045 0.011 -0.066 -0.022 -0.044***
Note: 1.  Lindley & Linton (2006) Estimates for white male natives vs. white male immigrants are presented for the years 1993-2003 
2. Chiswick & Miller (2007) estimates are for males only based on 2000 Census data. 
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 Table 7. Regression Estimates of Highly Skilled vs. Low-Skilled Occupations  
  Highly skilled occupations Low-skilled occupations 
Natives Immigrants Natives Immigrants 
 
Mincerian
Realized
Match Mincerian
Realized 
Match Mincerian
Realized 
Match Mincerian
Realized
Match 
         
France         
Education 
0.081*** 
(0.005)  
0.101*** 
(0.025)  
0.044*** 
(0.002)  
0.024 *** 
(0.006)  
‘Typical’ 
education  
0.088*** 
(0.005)  
0.120*** 
(0.024)  
0.063*** 
(0.003)  
0.038*** 
(0.007) 
Over-education  
0.056*** 
(0.008)  
0.073*** 
(0.030)  
0.059*** 
(0.005)  
0.031 ** 
(0.014) 
Under-education  
-0.051*** 
(0.009)  
0.031 
(0.052)  
-0.035*** 
(0.002)  
-0.015** 
(0.007) 
Number of 
Observations 2866 2866 235 235 6277 6277 686 686 
         
Germany         
Education 
0.075*** 
(0.007)  
0.036*** 
(0.014)  
0.102* 
(0.027)  
0.016 
(0.016)  
‘typical’ 
education  
0.085*** 
(0.007)  
0.108*** 
(0.017)  
0.138 
(0.039)  
0.059 
(0.040) 
Over-education  
0.054*** 
(0.010)  
0.020 
(0.013)  
-0.001 
(0.023)  
-0.019 
(0.105) 
Under-education   
-0.079*** 
(0.015)   
-0.156***      
(0.043)   
 -0.118***   
(0.019)   
0.016 
(0.016) 
Number of 
Observations 2914 2914 490 490 6155 6155 843 843 
                       Note: Austria is not considered due to insufficient observations
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 Chapter 3 
 
Productivity Differences and Agglomeration across 
Districts of Great Britain∗ 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Regional differences in economic performance within countries are often large and usually 
persistent. In developed countries, average labour productivity or workers’ income in the 
richest regions is double and sometimes triple that of the poorer regions. For example, the 
average hourly earnings in Great Britain in year 2003 are 22 pounds in some London 
boroughs and only 8.3 pounds in the county of Northumberland in the North East of 
Britain. The discrepancies are even higher in developing countries.52 Understanding the 
fundamental causes of these persistent inequalities is crucial in speeding up the 
development of those regions which are lagging behind.  
A key culprit among the possible explanations for regional differences in average 
labour productivity is the existence of spatial externalities and other sources of increasing 
returns such as transportation and coordination costs. Ciccone and Hall (1996) are the first 
to empirically analyze the agglomeration effects in Europe as a result of spatial externalities 
due to employment density. In their study, the density of economic activity is defined as the 
number of people employed per square kilometre.53 The main assumption of the paper is 
that in a world with constant returns to capital, where transportation costs are negligible due 
to well-developed infrastructure, employment density is a potential source of increasing 
                                                 
∗ I would like to thank Štěpán Jurajda, Randall Filer, Alexandru Chirmiciu and Brett Langston for their 
valuable suggestions and comments. 
52 For a detailed description of the regional income differences within a number of countries see Aten and 
Heston (2003). 
53 The terms agglomeration and employment density will be used interchangeably throughout the paper. 
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 returns resulting from stronger knowledge and technological spillovers in areas of dense 
economic activity. 
The main problem when estimating the strength of agglomeration effects is the 
potential reverse causality running from productivity to employment density: if high 
productivity regions tend to attract more workers then the estimated coefficient would be 
biased upwards. The presence of endogeneity is plausible since productivity or income can 
increase due to higher employment density as explained above, but it is also possible that 
higher productivity and wages may attract more workers and firms to a given area. Such 
reverse-causality can lead to overestimating of the effect of agglomeration on productivity 
and therefore should be carefully addressed. Ciccone and Hall (1996) contribute to the 
existing literature by credibly instrumenting the employment density by the total land area 
of the regions. 
There is extensive empirical literature on agglomeration-productivity relationship 
based on US data,54 and more recently a number of empirical studies on European 
countries.55 These studies estimate an elasticity of the average labour productivity with 
respect to the employment density in the range of 0.02 to 0.05.  The usual geographic level 
of analysis is county level (NUTS 3), and all existing studies use a maximum of one 
variable to instrument for employment density. Thus, the literature leaves several important 
questions to be answered such as what is the optimal geographic level at which the analysis 
should be conducted or how can agglomeration be best instrumented. My goal in this paper 
is to shed more light on the mechanism of the agglomeration effects by comparing results 
based on different levels of spatial division - NUTS 3 (county level) vs. NUTS 4 (district 
level), where a county is composed of more than one district. Furthermore, this study 
extends the existing literature by instrumenting for employment density simultaneously 
with two variables, which provides higher precision of estimates and is also important in 
the light of the current local average treatment effect (LATE) literature. Instrumenting 
agglomeration by total land area and population size at the same time corrects the estimates 
                                                 
54 See Rosenthal and Strange (2001) for the determinants of agglomeration and thorough analysis of 
agglomeration different geographic levels. See also Moomaw (1985), Henderson (1986) and the survey 
provided by Rosenthal and Strange (2004). 
55 Ciccone (2002), Combes et al. (2004), Duranton and Monastiriotis (2002), Kanbur and Venables (2003). 
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 since the two instruments weight the potentially heterogeneous effects across the 
population differently – more weight is given to those individuals for whom the given 
instrument has more predictive power (Angrist and Imbens, 1995).   
Specifically, this paper uses UK local authority district level (LAD) data provided 
by the Official Labour Market Statistics for the years 1998 and 2003. The analysis covers 
districts in England, Wales and Scotland, countries which are known for their large regional 
diversity and income differences.56 I adopt the specification used by Hall and Ciccone 
(1996) and Ciccone (2002), and examine the effect of agglomeration (employment density) 
on the average hourly earnings of UK workers across these districts.  
The total land area of districts and the population density which prevailed across 
districts in 1801 are used as instruments. Both types of instruments are commonly used in 
the existing literature (Ciccone and Hall, 1996; Ciccone, 2002; Rice and Venables, 2004; 
Combes et al., 2004) since they are correlated to the employment density but not to 
productivity or income. However, all the studies use the above instruments separately, 
while I instrument agglomeration using jointly the total land area and the population 
density across regions. Furthermore, I also distinguish between Metropolitan and non-
Metropolitan areas in an attempt to see whether the observed differences in productivity are 
driven mainly by the big cities and in particular by London.57 Finally, unlike most other 
studies, this paper provides rigorous testing of the validity of the employed instruments and 
the presence of endogeneity using various specification tests. 
The findings of the paper are generally in accordance with the existing research,58 
since the estimated elasticity of hourly earnings with respect to employment density is 
about 4 percent and there is no major difference between the district and county-level 
results. The agglomeration effects in Metropolitan areas are significantly higher than those 
exhibited by both non-Metropolitan areas and the sample as a whole. One possible reason 
                                                 
56 See Blackaby and Murphy (1995), Monastiriotis (2004), Rice and Venables (2004) . 
57 The focus of many agglomeration studies in the past has been on the potential relationship between city size 
and productivity (Moomaw, 1985; Henderson, 1986). These studies cover the US but suffer from output 
measurement error due to census miscalculation. Currently, the issue of size-specific agglomeration effects 
has gained popularity again (Strange, 2003). 
58 Existing research in trade and economic growth theories has estimated increasing returns to scale stemming 
from differences in human capital skills using alternative approaches and have reported similar estimates, e.g. 
Antweiler and Trefler (2002), Charles Jones (2005). 
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 for the presence of such non-linearity might be that the current Metropolitan areas of the 
UK are characterized by high employment in the prevalent financial and business services 
sectors which benefit from clustering of businesses together and information spillovers as 
opposed to other sectors such as manufacturing. 
 
3.2 Empirical and Theoretical Background 
 
The foundation of the recent literature on agglomeration (approximated by employment 
density) is provided by Ciccone & Hall (1996), who consider density as a source of 
aggregate increasing returns and define it as the intensity of labour, human and physical 
capital relative to physical space. Their results suggest that doubling employment density 
across US states would raise the average labour productivity by 6 percent. Rosenthal & 
Strange (2001) further analyze U.S. industries at three different aggregation levels: by zip 
code, county and state levels. The authors claim that agglomeration is positively affected by 
manufacturing inputs, shipping costs and natural resources on the state level, but these have 
little relevance at lower geographical levels.  
Extending the model of Ciccone and Hall (1996), Ciccone (2002) develops a 
theoretical model which is used to motivate the empirical estimates in this study. One of the 
assumptions of the model is that the density of economic activity is the source of spatial 
externalities responsible for average labour productivity differences across regions. 
The estimation of agglomeration effects using regional data stems from the 
following definition of the production function on an acre of land in region s, which 
belongs to a country or larger region c: 
 
q = Ωsc  f ( nH, k, Qsc, Asc) 
 
where q is the output per acre of land, n is the number of workers employed on the acre, H 
the average level of human capital of workers on the acre, and k the amount of physical 
 76
 capital used on the acre; Ωsc is the index of total factor productivity in the region; Qsc and 
Asc stand for the total production and total acreage in the region. The density of production 
Qsc / Asc represents the spatial externality associated by physical proximity. The model is 
developed further (see Ciccone, 2002) and as a result the estimation equation at the regional 
level is given by 
           
  Ec    
log Qsc – log Nsc = Large Region Dummies + θ (log Nsc – log Asc) + ∑ δec Fesc + usc         (1) 
           e=1 
 
where Nsc is the total employment in the region; Ec is the number of different education 
levels existing in the large region c; δec is the effect of the education level e on the 
productivity in large region c; Fesc is the fraction of employed people with certain type of 
education in region s in large region c and usc captures the differences between total factor 
productivity in region sc and a larger region.59  
The left-hand side of equation (1) represents the logarithm of the output or earnings 
per worker in a region and the term log (Nsc / Asc) is the log employment density or the 
agglomeration variable showing the number of workers employed per square kilometre. 
According to Ciccone (2002), in order to have a meaningful measure of the density 
of economic activity, one should estimate externalities at a ‘fine level of geographic 
details’. Therefore, in my analysis, I use regional data at the lowest possible geographic 
level (NUTS 4). One of the main disadvantages of working at this level is that there is no 
information of the quantity of physical capital across regions. Therefore, another important 
assumption of the model is that the rental price of capital is equal across large regions (here 
                                                 
59 See Ciccone (2002) and Ciccone and Hall (1996) for a detailed derivation of the estimated equation. 
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 counties or bigger regions) which helps to overcome the problem with the missing data on 
the quantity of physical capital at such a detailed geographic level.60 
Similar effects have been estimated in Europe as well. Ciccone (2002) examines 
five European economies (France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK) and estimates the 
effects of agglomeration on spatial differences of income to be 4.5 percent. The author 
instruments employment density by the regional total land area. Combes et al. (2004) base 
their research on a large panel of French workers for the period 1976-1996, and find that 
the elasticity of earnings with respect to employment density is 0.02. The endogeneity 
problem is addressed by instrumenting the employment density using the regional 
population density in 1936.  
Rice and Venables (2004) focus on regional income inequalities and their 
determinants. The authors consider the NUTS 3 sub-regions of Great Britain and explore 
the hypothesis that the proximity to economic mass, measured by driving time between 
regions, raises earnings. The authors instrument the proximity to economic mass by the 
population of the British counties in 1851, and find that the impact on productivity is the 
highest for economic centres within a driving time of 40 minutes. These findings are in full 
accordance with the existing literature which claims that the interaction effects that result in 
increasing returns are mostly due to local employment density.  
This paper uses UK regional data to study agglomeration effects at both county and 
district level and has two key features that distinguish it from the existing literature. First, I 
estimate agglomeration effects using two alternative instruments: total land area of the 
district and the population density of districts in 1801 (long before the industrial revolution 
took place in Great Britain). This allows for higher precision of estimates since the two 
instruments give different weights to the population depending on their predictive power. 
The second main difference with regards to the existing agglomeration studies is that the 
sample is split into Metropolitan areas (greater London and the metropolitan counties) and 
non-Metropolitan areas in order to allow for potential non-linearities in the 
agglomeration/earnings relationship. It is important to note that it is beyond the scope of the 
                                                 
60 See Ciccone (1996) and Ciccone (2002) for a detailed derivation of the rental capital price assumption. 
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 present paper to focus on industry-specific agglomeration effects. The main assumption is 
that the spatial variation in hourly earnings arises from knowledge spillovers and highly 
employee-dense regions rather than differences in wages across occupations. 
 
3.3 Data and Descriptive Analysis 
 
This study is based on data available from the Official Labour Market Statistics in the 
UK.61 The unit of analysis is the Local Authority District (LAD) which corresponds to 
NUTS 4 level and covers districts in England, Wales and Scotland. The basic building 
block for these areas is the electoral ward/division. The data is cross-sectional and consists 
of the two time periods of 1998 and 2003, because this reflects the possible change in the 
size of the effect of agglomeration and education on regional wages over time. 
There are 407 districts in the data and Table 1 shows that the variation of their areas 
is substantial. This is mainly due to the fact that the LADs are a mixture of single-tier and 
two-tier local government including metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas and 
boroughs. The local government structure in Great Britain underwent a substantial change 
in 1974-197562 which resulted in abolishment of the county boroughs, reduction of the 
number of upper-tier county councils and replacement of the 1250 lower-tier councils with 
369 district councils. In 1986, the government decided to promote London Boroughs and 
the Metropolitan District Councils from second-tier to single-tier authorities similar to the 
old county boroughs in the pre-1974 arrangements. The most recent changes have affected 
different parts of Great Britain and in many areas these have effectively reversed the 
1974/75 changes. Despite the fact that the areas of the current 407 LADs in the data were 
defined by the 1974-75 reform, the majority of them have shaped their current areas 
according to their pre-1974 local authority borders. For the sake of comparative analysis at 
different levels of aggregation I hereby present the same data on the county level. Once the 
districts are aggregated to local government counties the number of observations falls to 
200.  
                                                 
61 See www.nomisweb.co.uk where Nomis is a web-based database of labour market statistics. 
62 See www.statistics.gov.uk/geography or www.genuki.org.uk 
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 The usual practice in estimating differences in productivity is to look at the gross 
value added per worker across regions. The UK National Labour Market Statistics do not 
offer data on value added at district level and although it could be approximated by 
different measures, it would still have the disadvantage that within small areas it is highly 
sensitive to local profits allocation and other non-wage income. In my analysis I focus on 
other commonly used proxy for productivity – the average hourly earnings of full-time 
employees. The average hourly earnings are taken from The New Earnings Survey, which 
is an annual survey based on a sample of one percent of employees in employment 
excluding self-employed workers.63 While the use of average hourly earnings may have 
some shortcomings, such as distortions due to differences in labour intensity of local 
production or local employment opportunities (e.g., unemployment), the labour market in 
Great Britain is highly competitive, ensuring mobility of labour and capital across regions, 
such that differences in earnings are expected to reflect differences in productivity. 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics for the average hourly earnings of the 
employed population between 18 and 60 years of age at district and county levels. The 
average hourly wage varies from 9 pounds in 1998 to 11 pounds in 2003. Workers in rich 
regions receive almost three times higher wages compared to those in poor regions, a fact 
that confirms the importance of spatial differences in income across UK districts and 
counties. These characteristics of the hourly earnings at county level are very similar to 
those displayed by Rice and Venables (2004). 
Agglomeration is measured by employment density which equals the average 
number of full-time employed workers per square kilometre in a given district. Table 3 
shows the main characteristics of the agglomeration where the magnitude of the coefficient 
of variation takes values of 1.3 up to 1.49 and indicates large employment diversity across 
                                                 
63 The hourly payments made to the employee are before any statutory or other deductions. They include all 
payments which related to that period regardless of when particular payments within the total were made or 
whether they were all paid at the same time. Where bonuses or similar payments are not paid in each pay-
period, they include the proportionate amount for the reported pay-period based on the last payment, or next 
payment if known (for example, one-quarter of a monthly bonus for a weekly pay-period). 
 80
 districts and counties with an increasing share of people employed per square kilometre 
over time. 
Education is one of the most important characteristics to control for when studying 
wage differences. The data on education comes from regional Labour Force Surveys and 
covers the percentage of economically active workers with different types of education: 
NVQ4, NQV3, NQV2, NQV1, trade apprenticeships, other and no qualifications. I have 
grouped the educational levels in three groups: high education (NQV4 and NQV3), low 
education (NQV2, NQV1, trade apprenticeships and other qualifications) and no formal 
qualifications.64 
Evidence of the positive upward trend of the relationship between agglomeration 
and earnings across regions is provided by figure 1, which is based on raw data for hourly 
earnings and employment density across UK NUTS 4 districts for the years 1998 and 2003. 
 
3.4 Estimation Results 
 
In this section, I account for the effect of agglomeration on average wages across regions in 
Great Britain. Firstly, table 4 and table 5 present the results of three different OLS 
specifications at both district and county level for the years 1998 and 2003. Looking at the 
district level results in both tables, specification 1 considers the pure effect of 
agglomeration on the average regional earnings. Specification 2 includes large region 
dummies65, and specification 3 provides the richest equation offered by Ciccone (2002) 
where the corresponding proportion of workers at a certain education level plays a role in 
explaining regional wage inequalities.66 There is a strong positive relationship between the 
                                                 
64 NQV4 – first and higher degree; nursing and teaching qualification; NQV3 – A-level; GNVQ Higher level, 
Advanced certificate of Vocational Education; NVQ2 – GCSE qualifications at grade B or higher, GNVQ 
Intermediate level; NVQ1 – GSCE qualifications below grade C, GNVQ Foundation level. 
 
65 There are 11 large regions dummy variables: North East, North West, Yorkshire and the Humber; East 
Midlands, West Midlands, East, London, South East, South West, Scotland and Wales. 
66 As a robustness check in the regressions I control also for NUTS 2 dummies in case the regional dummies 
are not present. The results are not significantly different. 
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 average proportion of workers with high education and the corresponding average regional 
earnings. Regardless of the employed specification, the elasticity of hourly earnings with 
respect to employment density is around 0.04 for both years.67 The results reported here 
confirm the findings of existing studies (e.g., Ciccone, 2002; Rice and Venables, 2004) and 
demonstrate a robust OLS relationship between agglomeration and average labour income. 
Next, the aggregation of the regional data to the next geographic level, i.e. county 
level, is performed with the main goal of comparing the results at district and county levels.  
While there is no a priori optimal geographical level to detect agglomeration effects, these 
are normally found to rapidly decay with distance. Interestingly, aggregating district level 
data to the county level yields very similar results. Tables 4 and 5 present the OLS 
estimates at county level, which suggest no major difference in agglomeration related to the 
level of aggregation. The coefficient of agglomeration falls from 0.04 (district level) to 0.03 
(county level) for both years based on the richest specification. It appears that 
agglomeration effects do not depend on whether the geographical unit of analysis is district 
or county.68  
As Fig. 1 suggests, a group of districts (Metropolitan areas) may exhibit 
substantially higher employment density and wages than the rest of the regions. 
Metropolitan areas (London in particular) are known to have high employment densities 
and wages, which lead to the question of the existence of possible non-linearities in the 
earnings/agglomeration relationship. Therefore, in order to find out whether the 
agglomeration effects on wages are not mainly driven by London and other big 
metropolitan areas, I split the sample into two groups - Metropolitan and non-Metropolitan 
areas.69 In the case of Great Britain, Metropolitan areas consist of 71 districts.70 
                                                 
67 The agglomeration effects were confirmed to be 0.06 at large regions’ aggregation level though the result is 
not statistically meaningful due to the low number of degrees of freedom. 
68 All specifications include large region (NUTS 1) dummy variables. 
69 The dummy variable for Metropolitan areas in the OLS specification of the whole sample is significant at 
the 1% significance level. 
70 Metropolitan areas include greater London, greater Manchester, Merseyside, South Yorkshire, Tyne and 
Wear, West Midlands, West Yorkshire, Glasgow city and Cardiff. 
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 Tables 6 and 7 show the OLS regression results at district and county levels for all 
three samples: the whole sample, the Metropolitan, and non-Metropolitan areas for the 
years 1998 and 2003. Overall, the tables show no difference between the OLS results at 
district and county levels. Focusing on the district level, we notice that for both years the 
coefficients of agglomeration for the whole sample and that for non-Metropolitan areas are 
the same. However, there is a significant difference in the magnitude of the agglomeration 
estimate for Metropolitan areas where the coefficient is 0.10 in 1998 and 0.09 in 2003 in 
comparison to 0.04 in the other two samples for both years.71  The effect of education is 
similar for all samples in that average wages are higher in areas with a higher proportion of 
workers with high education, and consequently lower if there is high proportion of workers 
with low education in the region. All specifications include dummy variables for the 
presence of large regions at the higher aggregation level.72  
The results suggest a new feature of the agglomeration-productivity relationship. 
While there is no significant difference between county and district level of aggregation, 
agglomeration effects soar in case of big densely populated Metropolitan areas. The high 
concentration of employees per unit of land seems to foster productivity growth. However, 
the presence of potential endogeneity between agglomeration and productivity may lead to 
different results and provide new insights on the mechanism of this relationship. 
 
3.5 Endogeneity 
 
In case regional dummy variables do not capture exogenous differences in incomes across 
regions, then areas with high exogenous incomes attract more workers and have 
subsequently higher employment density. As a result, OLS yields inconsistent estimates. 
                                                 
71 The coefficient of agglomeration for Metropolitan areas is significantly different from those in non-
Metropolitan areas and the whole sample at the 5% significance level. 
72 Looking at externalities not only within but also across districts, I controlled in the regressions for 
neighboring regions. The agglomeration coefficient did not change significantly. 
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 The potential reverse causality between wage income and employment density calls for a 
different estimation approach involving instrumental variables. 
The instrumental-variables approach requires that valid instruments are applied. In 
this case, potential instruments are certain characteristics of districts that are correlated to 
agglomeration (employment density) but not correlated to the current incomes of 
employees across districts. This analysis uses two instruments for agglomeration: the total 
land area of the district and the population density which dates back to 1801. The total land 
area of the region is commonly used as an instrument for employment density in the 
literature (Ciccone, 2002; Ciccone and Hall, 1996). The total land area of the districts in the 
data has been shaped by the administrative reform of 1974, though the majority of districts 
have naturally converged to their pre-1974 borders.73 However, total land is significantly 
negatively correlated with employment density across districts which could be explained by 
possible historical equalization of population size across districts.74 Another explanation 
for that negative relationship is through the price of land influenced by potentially better 
consumption amenities (Wheaton and Lewis, 2002; Combes et al., 2004) which make the 
agglomeration coefficient biased downwards.75  
The second instrument for employment density is the population density in 1801, 
which is positively correlated to agglomeration and not related to productivity or income 
across districts.76 This historic instrument reflects the way population was distributed in the 
past regardless of productivity incentives, long before the industrial revolution took place in 
Great Britain. Data on the population inhabiting the current borders of the districts in 1801 
has been reproduced using the published statistics of the registration districts existing at 
                                                 
73 Changes in the boundaries of administrative units were manly based on political and administrative 
decisions rather than on productivity developments across regions 
74 The coefficient of variation of the population in 1901 (which is similar to that of 1801) compared to that in 
2003 has decreased from 1.06 to 0.68 which indicates that currently the population is substantially more 
equalized across areas than in 1901. 
75 Better consumption amenities imply higher land prices which have negative effect on local wages. Since 
land prices are omitted from the regression equation, their negative effect enters the residual which is 
negatively correlated to employment density since better consumption amenities attract more workers in the 
region. 
76 See Rice and Venables, 2004; Combes et al., 2004. 
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 that time. The very nature of estimating the historical inhabitants of nowadays districts 
makes the population density a credible instrument for agglomeration. 
Table 8 shows the two-stage least squares estimation of agglomeration effects on 
average earnings in 2003 using the two instruments: the modern total land area of a region 
and the population density of a district in 1801. Focusing on the full specification and 
accounting for both education and regional effects, I examine the instrumental estimation 
for all three samples. The tendency of agglomeration to have a larger impact on earnings in 
Metropolitan areas is preserved and the agglomeration coefficient falls from 0.09 in OLS to 
0.08 when instrumented.  
This fact confirms the hypothesis of potential endogeneity which appears also in 
non-Metropolitan areas. There the agglomeration effect decreases from 0.04 to 0.02, once 
the instrumental-variables approach is applied. However, when looking at the results for the 
sample as a whole, the agglomeration coefficient does not change its value from 0.04, 
which casts doubts over the reverse causality between agglomeration and wages across 
regions, and calls for rigorous testing of endogeneity presence and instruments’ validity. 
Comparing tables 7 and 8 suggests the same tendency at county level and therefore 
presented below are robustness checks of results at district level only.77  
 
Model tests 
The key to any instrumental-variable (IV) approach is to find valid instrumental variables 
which are exogenous (correctly excluded from the main equation) and which are not weak. 
In case the instruments are weak, then the presence of even slight correlation between the 
instruments and the error term in the original equation can lead to large inconsistencies of 
the IV estimates. The problem of ‘weak instruments’ arises either when the instruments are 
only weakly correlated with the endogenous regressor, or their number is too large (Angrist 
and Krueger, 2001). Once valid instruments are employed, the final step is to find out 
whether endogeneity is present in the first place (Hausman, 1978). In case of no evidence 
                                                 
77 Model tests at county level are available upon request. 
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 of endogenous relationship, the use of instrumental-variables approach becomes 
unnecessary.  
Exogeneity of instruments is tested by regressing the endogenous variable on the 
potential instruments, which in this case should be correlated with employment density and 
not correlated with wages. The first two OLS specifications in table 9 present the results of 
testing the exogeneity of the two instruments at district level for 2003. We can note from 
the table that the coefficients of both the total land area and the population density are 
significant at the 1% significance level in case agglomeration is the dependent variable, and 
they are not significantly different from zero when wages are estimated. Table 9 presents 
also specifications 3 and 4 where agglomeration is instrumented with only one instrument 
at a time, while the other instrument is included directly in the main equation (Card, 1993).  
We observe that in both cases the instrumental variables which are included directly in the 
main equation are not significant. Therefore, these two instruments are exogenous and are 
properly omitted from the initial regression equation. 
In order to examine the assumption of whether the instruments are weak, a common 
approach is to look at the F-statistic for the joint significance of the instruments in the first 
stage equation (Bound et al., 1995). In case the F-statistic is larger than 10 the instruments 
are not considered to be weak (Staiger and Stock, 1997, Stock, Wright and Yogo, 2002). 
We can see from table 8 that the first stage F-statistics for the two instruments in use, are 
well above 10 for all the three samples under consideration, which shows that the 
instruments are jointly highly relevant and predict well the endogenous variable. 
In case the endogenous variable is instrumented by more instruments, an over-
identification test for the mutual consistence of the available instruments can be used. One 
of the most commonly applied tests is the Hansen (1982) / Sargan (1958) test, whose null 
hypothesis is that the excluded instruments are valid instruments and uncorrelated with the 
error term.78 The first row of table 10 shows the Hansen-Sargan statistic for all the samples 
under analysis and the p-values in the parenthesis which are 0.29 for the whole sample, 
                                                 
78 Under the null hypothesis the Hansen-Sargan statistics is distributed as chi-square in the number of over-
identifying restrictions which are two in this case. 
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 0.16 for the Metropolitan areas and 0.48 for non-Metropolitan areas show that we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis and therefore the instruments are jointly valid. However, there are 
studies that show that this test may have low power in case of general misspecification (e.g. 
Newey, 1985). 
Hahn and Hausman (2002) developed a new overidentifying restriction test which 
takes a general specification approach and examines the relevance of the application of 
conventional first order asymptotics. They claim that in the case of valid first order 
asymptotic inference, a change in normalization would yield similar forward and inverse 
coefficient estimates. Specifically, the forward (orthodox) two stage estimate of the 
coefficient of the right-hand side endogenous variable should be very similar to the inverse 
estimate from the reverse (the right hand side endogenous variables becomes the dependent 
variable and the dependent variable from the forward regression becomes the right-hand 
side variable) two stage regression using the same instruments. In case the two estimates 
are too different, the Hahn/Hausman test sees whether this difference in estimates satisfies 
the results of second order asymptotic theory.  
The second and third rows of table 10 show that the forward estimate for the whole 
sample is 0.038 while the inverse one is 0.041, the Metropolitan areas forward estimate is 
0.082 while the inverse one is 0.11, and finally for non-Metropolitan areas the forward 
coefficient is 0.026 and in inverse one is 0.028. The inverse estimates for all three samples 
are significant at the 1% significance level and are almost the same as the forward 
estimates, which proves that the first order asymptotics is relevant and the main equation is 
correctly specified.  
Given that the instruments are valid, the last specification test is the Durbin-Wu-
Hausman test, which is widely used in applied research to test the presence of endogeneity. 
The null hypothesis of that test is that the specification is proper and all the explanatory 
variables are exogenous. Table 10 shows that for all three samples endogeneity is present. 
The strongest case for endogenous relationship between agglomeration and wages across 
regions is the one for the Metropolitan areas where the p-value of 0.75 indicates 
endogeneity at the 1% significance level. 
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 Overall, the use of the instrumental-variables approach is justified for all three 
samples, though for the full sample the agglomeration effects do not change once 
employment density is instrumented by the total land area of the regions and the regional 
population density. Splitting the sample into Metropolitan and non-Metropolitan areas 
reveals the presence of endogeneity in the non-Metropolitan sample where agglomeration 
estimates fall from 0.04 to 0.02. Despite the fact that the Metropolitan areas agglomeration 
coefficient decreases by only 1 percentage point due to the endogenous 
earnings/agglomeration relationship, these areas still exhibit much higher agglomeration 
effects than non-Metropolitan areas (0.08 compared to 0.02). The lower aggregation level 
(NUTS 4) enabled a detailed analysis of the endogeneity problem which appears to have 
new dimensions once Metropolitan areas are accounted for. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
The main goal of this paper is to shed more light on the agglomeration effects on wages 
across districts of Great Britain. The empirical analysis for the two years of observation, 
1998 and 2003, shows that there is a stable positive relationship between agglomeration as 
measured by employment density and the average earnings at the regional level. Doubling 
agglomeration would raise wages by 4% at both district and county level. Since counties 
are larger territorial units than districts and so capture agglomeration spillovers in-between 
districts, one may expect the agglomeration effects on productivity measured across 
counties to be higher than that estimated off district data. On the other hand, measuring 
wages and agglomeration at the county level may introduce measurement error as it may 
obscure important differences within counties. Hence, a possible explanation for the similar 
agglomeration effect at county and district level is that these two opposing forces cancel 
each other.  
Estimating agglomeration effects separately for Metropolitan and non-Metropolitan 
areas, reveals that the density-productivity relationships is much stronger among the 
former. Metropolitan areas exhibit higher levels of employment density and wages across 
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 regions which could potentially result in a different agglomeration-productivity relationship 
in major cities as opposed to the one observed in non-Metropolitan areas. One possible 
reason for the presence of such non-linearity might be that the current Metropolitan areas of 
the UK are characterized by high employment in the prevalent financial and business 
services sectors which benefit from clustering of businesses together and information 
spillovers as opposed to other sectors such as manufacturing.  
Therefore, allowing for non-linearities, in the next step of the analysis I separately 
re-estimate the preferred specifications for the Metropolitan and non-Metropolitan sub-
samples. While non-Metropolitan areas exhibit similar coefficients to those prevailing 
when the whole sample is under consideration, comparing wages and agglomeration within 
Metropolitan areas shows significantly higher agglomeration effects. The high 
concentration of employees per unit of land in Metropolitan areas seems to have a much 
stronger positive effect on productivity than the effect of employment density on 
productivity in non-Metropolitan areas.  
I address the potential reverse causality issues by means of two-stage least squares 
estimates. Differently from other studies, two instruments are used in the analysis: the total 
land area of the district and its population density in 1801. Both instruments proved to be 
valid and to explain agglomeration well. The instrumental-variable results confirm the OLS 
tendency of Metropolitan areas to exhibit the highest agglomeration effects on productivity 
though the estimates are slightly lower due to upward biasness of the original estimates. 
Reverse causality between agglomeration and productivity is present also in the non-
Metropolitan areas sample where the agglomeration effect decreases by 2 percentage 
points. These results prove even further that agglomeration has a weaker impact on wages 
in non-Metropolitan areas in comparison to the effect it has across densely populated 
Metropolitan areas. 
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 3.A Appendix 
Table 1. Area of Districts and Counties (square kilometres) 
 Districts Counties
 Area 2003 Area 2003 
Mean 605.11 1349.899
Variance 2420356 6426088
Coefficient of Variation 2.57 1.88
Minimum 21 27
Maximum 25784 25784
Number of Observation 407 200
Source: Office for National Statistics, UK 
 
Table 2. Average Hourly Earnings (in British Pounds) 
 Districts Counties 
 Average Hourly 
Earnings 1998 
Average Hourly  
Earnings 2003 
Average Hourly 
Earnings 1998 
Average Hourly  
Earnings 2003 
Mean 9.40 11.24 9.58 11.41
Variance 2.36 4.21 2.43 4.46
Coefficient of Variation 0.16 0.18 0.16 0.18
Minimum 6.47 8.03 7.57 8.95
Maximum 16.4 21.54 16.4 21.43
Number of Observation 407 407 200 200
Source: Office for National Statistics, UK 
 93
  94
Table 3. Employment Density (number of full-time employees per square km.) 
 Districts Counties 
 Empl. 
Density 1998 
Empl. Density 
2003 
Empl. Density 
1998 
Empl. Density 
2003 
Mean 557.62 571.96 800.01 828.80
Variance 665378.7 730103.7 1075032 1198368
Coefficient of Variation 1.46 1.49 1.30 1.32
Minimum 2.87 3.19 2.87 3.19
Maximum 5166.67 6000 5166.67 6000
Number of Observations 407 407 200 200
Source: Office for National Statistics, UK 
 
Fig.1. The Wage-Agglomeration Relationship  
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Source: Office for National Statistics, UK 
 
 Table 4. OLS Estimates of the Effect of Agglomeration on Earnings: Districts vs. Counties (1998) 
 
 Districts 
Average Earnings 1998 
Counties 
Average Earnings 1998 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Agglomeration 
 
0.054*** 
     (0.005) 
0.043*** 
     (0.005) 
0.036*** 
     (0.006) 
0.053*** 
     (0.006) 
0.041*** 
    (0.006) 
0.032*** 
     (0.006) 
 
High Educationa  
 
No No 0.217
*** 
     (0.044) No No 
0.194*** 
(0.043) 
 
Low Education 
 
No No -0.072      (0.058) No No 
-0.060 
     (0.047) 
 
Regional Dummies 
 
No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
 
R2 
 
0.27 0.46 0.60 0.34 0.56 0.68 
 
Number of Observations 
 
406 403 254 200 199 151 
 Note: Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 1 percent significance level 
a  The base case is no formal education. When looking at district level standard errors are clustered by counties. 
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 Table 5. OLS Estimates of the Effect of Agglomeration on Earnings: Districts vs. Counties (2003) 
 
 Districts 
Average Earnings 2003 
Counties 
Average Earnings 2003 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Agglomeration 
 
0.053*** 
     (0.005) 
0.045*** 
    (0.006) 
0.036*** 
     (0.007) 
0.054*** 
     (0.006) 
0.042*** 
    (0.007) 
0.029*** 
     (0.007) 
 
High Educationa  
 
No No 0.140
*** 
(0.058) No No 
0.186*** 
(0.070) 
 
Low Education 
 
No No -0.191
*** 
     (0.055) No No 
-0.142*** 
     (0.044) 
 
Regional Dummies 
 
No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
 
R2 
 
0.22 0.40 0.51 0.30 0.52 0.64 
 
Number of Observations 
 
406 404 292 200 198 175 
 Note: Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses.  *** denotes significance at the 1 percent significance level; ** denotes  
significance at the 5 percent significance level; * denotes significance at the 10 percent significance level. 
a The base case is no formal education. When looking at district level standard errors are clustered by counties. 
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 Table 6. The Effect of Agglomeration on Earnings at district and county level (1998) 
 
 Districts Counties 
 1 
OLS: 
Whole Sample
2 
OLS: 
MetroAreas 
3 
OLS: 
No-MetroAreas
4 
OLS: 
Whole Sample
5 
OLS: 
MetroAreas 
6 
OLS: 
No-MetroAreas
 
Agglomeration 
 
0.036*** 
     (0.006) 
0.101*** 
       (0.024) 
0.034*** 
       (0.005) 
0.032*** 
     (0.006) 
0.094*** 
       (0.028) 
0.033*** 
       (0.007) 
 
High Education  
 
0.217*** 
     (0.044) 
0.176** 
(0.063) 
0.239*** 
        (0.052) 
0.194*** 
(0.043) 
0.181** 
(0.078) 
0.207*** 
        (0.051) 
 
Low Education 
 
-0.072 
     (0.058) 
-0.076 
(0.117) 
-0.023 
        (0.067) 
-0.060 
      (0.047) 
-0.070 
(0.102) 
-0.055 
        (0.045) 
 
Regional Dummies 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.60 0.65 0.54 0.68 0.65 0.59 
 
Number of 
Observations 
 
254 65 189 151 65 86 
 Note: Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 1 percent significance level; ** denotes significance at the 5 percent  
 significance level; * denotes significance at the 10 percent significance level. The coefficient of agglomeration in (2) is significantly different from the  
 one in (3) at the 5% significance level. 
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Table 7. The Effect of Agglomeration on Earnings at district and county level (2003) 
 1 
OLS: 
Whole Sample
2 
OLS: 
MetroAreas 
3 
OLS: 
No-MetroAreas
4 
OLS: 
Whole Sample
5 
OLS: 
MetroAreas 
6 
OLS: 
No-MetroAreas
 
Agglomeration 
 
0.036*** 
     (0.007) 
0.091*** 
       (0.025) 
0.042*** 
       (0.005) 
0.029*** 
     (0.007) 
0.091*** 
       (0.025) 
0.032*** 
       (0.007) 
 
High Education  
 
0.140*** 
(0.058) 
0.01 
(0.124) 
0.185*** 
        (0.064) 
0.186*** 
(0.070) 
0.124*** 
(0.006) 
0.208*** 
        (0.061) 
 
Low Education 
 
-0.191*** 
     (0.055) 
-0.278*** 
       (0.072) 
-0.097 
        (0.080) 
-0.142*** 
     (0.044) 
-0.203*** 
       (0.072) 
-0.055 
        (0.045) 
 
Regional Dummies 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.51 0.62 0.45 0.64 0.62 0.59 
 
Number of 
Observations 
 
292 68 224 175 68 107 
 Note: Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 1 percent significance level,; ** denotes significance at the 5 percent   
significance level; * denotes significance at the 10 percent significance level. The coefficient of agglomeration in (2) is significantly different from the one  
in (3) at the 5% significance level.  
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  Table 8. The Effect of Agglomeration on Earnings using Population Density 1801 and Area as Instruments (2003) 
 Districts Counties 
 1 
IV:  
Whole Sample 
2 
IV: 
MetroAreas  
3 
IV: 
No-MetroAreas 
4 
IV:  
Whole Sample
5 
IV: 
MetroAreas  
6 
IV: 
No-MetroAreas 
 
Agglomeration 
 
0.038*** 
       (0.010) 
0.083*** 
      (0.023) 
0.026*** 
       (0.010) 
0.043*** 
       (0.015) 
0.084*** 
      (0.023) 
0.022*** 
         (0.011) 
 
High Education  
 
0.130*** 
       (0.058) 
0.011 
      (0.126) 
0.165*** 
        (0.066) 
0.156*** 
       (0.075) 
0.153*** 
      (0.085) 
0.213*** 
         (0.066) 
 
Low Education 
 
-0.199*** 
       (0.055) 
-0.289*** 
 (0.075) 
-0.116 
         (0.082) 
-0.159*** 
       (0.048) 
-0.291*** 
 (0.075) 
-0.049 
           (0.046) 
 
Regional Dummies 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
First–stage F–statistic for 
both instruments 
 
221.22  71.01 125.78 183.84  71.01 84.25 
R2 0.51 0.62 0.44 0.63 0.61 0.59 
 
Number of Observations 
 
290 68 222 
 
175 68 107 
 Note: Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 1 percent significance level; ** denotes significance at the 5 percent 
significance level; * denotes significance at the 10 percent significance level. The coefficient of agglomeration in (2) is significantly different from the one in (3) at 
the 5% significance level. The results for 1998 are similar to those for 2003 and are available upon request. 
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 Table 9. Reduced Form and Structural Estimates of the Earnings and Agglomeration Models (year 2003) 
 
 1 
Agglomeration  
OLS 
2 
Earnings 
OLS 
3 
Earnings 
2STLS 
4 
Earnings 
2STLS 
Population Density 1801 0.66
*** 
            (0.08) 
0.05 
(0.08) 
0.01 
(0.02) ----- 
Area -0.02
*** 
            (0.01) 
-0.00005 
 (0.00006) ---- 
0.005 
(0.008) 
Regional Dummies and other 
control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.60 0.48 0.51 0.51 
Number of Observations 401 290 290 290 
 Note: Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses. *** denotes significance at 1 percent significance level; ** denotes significance at 5 percent significance                
level; * denotes significance at 10 percent significance level. 
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Table 10. Over-identifying Restrictions and Endogeneity Tests 
 
 Whole sample MetroAreas Non-MetroAreas 
 IV: Population Density 1801 and Area 
Hansen-Sargan test 
p-value 
       χ2(1)=1.10 
(0.29) 
      χ2(1)=2.82 
(0.16) 
     χ2(1)=0.49 
(0.48) 
    
Agglomeration 
(Forward Estimate) 
 0.038*** 
         (0.010) 
0.082*** 
          (0.023) 
0.026*** 
             (0.008) 
    
                                       Inverse reverse estimate  
Agglomeration 
(Reverse estimate)           Reverse estimate 
            
 0.041***
 
 24.66*** 
          (7.17) 
0.11***
 
 9.05 *** 
           (2.96) 
0.028*** 
 
  34.81  *** 
              (8.93) 
    
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test          0.14          (0.70) 
           0.10 
           (0.75) 
              2.77 
              (0.11) 
Education           Yes            Yes               Yes 
Regional Dummies and Other control 
variables           Yes            Yes               Yes 
Number of Observations           290             68               222 
 Note *** denotes significance at 1 percent significance level. Standard errors are in parentheses with the exception of Hansen-Sargan 
 test and Durbin-Wu-Hausman test where p-values are reported in the parentheses.  
 
